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Abstract
In this thesis, a model for argument revision is presented, in terms of the expansion and
contraction of a system of structured argumentation. At its core, the model uses the belief
revision concept of minimal change, but without requiring a pre-determined entrenchment
ordering to establish minimality.
In the first part of the thesis, a model for argument revision is defined and described.
Specified in terms of the ASPIC+ framework for argumentation, the model is divided
into two main concepts: argument expansion, whose goal is to make certain arguments
acceptable in the system, possibly by adding them; and argument contraction, whose goal
is to make certain arguments unacceptable in the system, possibly by removing them. The
goal of a revision process can be achieved in multiple different ways, thus a method of
choosing which, based on measures of minimal change, is also specified.
The second part of the thesis demonstrates two applications of the model in the context
of multi-agent dialogue. The first is used to assist a participant when faced with a need to
update its commitment store during persuasion dialogue, while the second shows how a
participant can use argument revision techniques to both assess and maintain a lie.
The main contributions of the thesis are twofold. First, the characterisation of a
model for argument revision, based on established belief revision principles but with a
key difference. The model for argument revision demonstrates how it is possible to use
measurable effects on the system when determining minimal change instead of relying on
xii
a pre-determined, qualitative entrenchment ordering.
Second, the thesis demonstrates two applications of argument revision in dialogue. The
first is in assisting an agent in retracting a commitment that has been defeated, and for
which it can offer no defence. When retracting a claim, the participant may also be required
to retract other claims from which the defeated one is a consequence. Applying argument
revision techniques allow the participant to reason about what constitutes a minimal set of
retractions, in terms of current commitments and potential future communications in the
dialogue.
The second dialogical application relates to the opposite of retraction; instead of
choosing to retract an undefended claim, the participant could instead choose to lie in order
to defend it. Argument revision allows the participant to not only assess whether or not
lying is “minimal” (compared to retracting), but to also to maintain the lie, by using the
measures of minimal change.
Overall, the thesis shows that not only is justifiable argument revision possible without
relying on a pre-determined entrenchment ordering, it is also a powerful tool for participants
in a dialogue, assisting with dialogue move selection.
1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Argumentation is a broad research field, with contributions from computer science, philos-
ophy, discourse analysis and law. An emerging area in the field is the connection between
argumentation and artificial intelligence, specifically the artificial modelling of human-
style reasoning, using systems of argumentation with established theories of inference,
conflict and evaluation. However, in addition to these, the modelling of further concepts
are required; one such concept is dynamics — how the system reacts to change, in terms
of gaining and losing information.
Belief revision is the study of belief dynamics, with one of the most prominent theories
being the eponymous AGM theory [Alchourro´n et al., 1985], which is based on a principle
of minimal change — when updating a belief set, it should be done so with the smallest
possible change on other beliefs. Research into connections between belief revision and
argumentation has recently found new momentum [Falappa et al., 2009, 2012], with two
broad areas emerging — the use of argumentation to assist the belief revision process
(e.g. [Kru¨mpelmann et al., 2012]), and the use of belief revision techniques to model the
dynamics of argumentation systems (e.g. [Rotstein et al., 2008]).
In this thesis, a model for Argument Revision is specified in which the dynamics of an
2existing system of structured argumentation are modelled through the application of the
belief revision principle of minimal change. This model differs from existing approaches
to specifying argument dynamics, such as that found in Rotstein et al.’s [2008] Argument
Theory Change (ATC) by decoupling the model of dynamics and making it extrinsic to the
system of argumentation to which it applies. ATC defines a new Dynamic Argumentation
Framework, based on a Dung [1995] style abstract framework, which incorporates a sub-
argument relation and a concept of warranting, which is used as part of the dynamics model.
The model of argument revision presented here takes an existing system of structured
argumentation and specifies revision operators and a determination of minimal change
based on elements of the system. To assist with the specification of Argument Revision, a
principled definition of meta-level extensions to the system is also provided, which offer
wider advantages and applications beyond the modelling of dynamics.
The thesis also explores an application of the model as a strategic tool in multi-
agent dialogue. A clear, but under-researched, link exists between belief revision and
philosophical and computational models of dialogue [Girle, 1997, 2002]. Protocols based
on the Walton and Krabbe [1995] dialogue typology provide each participant with a
commitment store, and a record of statements they have uttered and/or conceded during
the dialogue. This, by definition, is dynamic — statements are added and removed as the
dialogue progresses. Statements are removed from a commitment store through retractions,
which some protocols, such as RPD0, mandating that when a statement is retracted, other
statements of which the retracted statement is a consequence must also be retracted; this is
known as a stability adjustment.
Selecting what, if any, statements to retract illustrates a connection between dialogue
and belief revision — intuitively, a participant would retract the statements that, through
applying some criteria, have a minimal impact on both existing commitments and also
potential future commitments. The impact on existing commitments arises through intro-
ducing inconsistencies and/or removing statements that prevent a given statement from
being inferred (under closure). The impact on potential future commitments comes from
3the inability to communicate a statement of which a previously retracted statement is a
consequence (for instance, if P is a consequence of Q and Q is retracted, P cannot then
be stated).
A second application of Argument Revision in dialogue, dishonesty, is also explored.
Being dishonest is a form of belief revision and, by extension Argument Revision, in that
although dishonesty does not see a dialogue participant change their actual beliefs, they
must perform a revision process (w.r.t. the source of the dishonesty) in order to determine
an epistemic state they must appear to hold in order to avoid detection. Additionally,
where multiple possible dishonest acts exist, minimal change is used to decide which to
choose.
1.2 Motivation
Modelling the argument dynamics is important if we are to effectively model human
reasoning in systems of argumentation. When a human is faced with new information, they
(perhaps subconsciously) perform an assessment of the information to determine how it
fits into their current beliefs and the effects thereof. Investigating the dynamics of belief
forms the basis of a research field broadly described as belief revision. One of the most
prominent and influential theories in belief revision is the AGM theory [Alchourro´n et al.,
1985], which describes operations, and the properties thereof, for three types of belief
dynamic: expansion, where new beliefs are added to a belief set, with no consideration
for consistency; contraction, where existing beliefs are removed; and revision, where
new beliefs are added and old ones given up (where necessary) to maintain consistency.
One of the guiding principles in all three processes is minimal change — when multiple
methods of performing a process exist, choose the one that has the least impact on existing
or remaining beliefs.
Given the prominence of Alchourro´n et al.’s work, it is not surprising that it has formed
the basis of existing research into connections between argumentation and belief revision
4that focus on the modelling of argument dynamics. Rotstein et al. [2008] define a dynamic
argumentation framework whose dynamics are modelled using AGM-style operators, while
certain properties of change in abstract argumentation defined by Cayrol et al. [2010] are
also inspired by AGM concepts.
The dynamic argumentation framework defined in Rotstein et al.’s work is based on
Dung’s abstract frameworks, but incorporates a model of dynamics, while Cayrol et al.
examine change in Dung-style frameworks “as-is”, i.e. they do not define a new or extended
framework, but instead investigate the properties of changing a framework constructed
according to the original definition of [Dung, 1995].
Both approaches have their advantages; defining a new argumentation framework
whose dynamics are a part of the system means that the system intrinsically contains what
is required to model change and hence determinations of, for instance, the effects of a
change will be more readily available. Additionally, through the use of a sub-argument
relation, the framework defined in ATC is also structured, providing a better model of
dynamics and a clear link to natural arguments, which are inherently structured. On the
other hand, developing a model of dynamics for an existing framework that is based on
an assessment of the effects of different types of change decouples the model from the
framework to which it applies. This has the distinct advantage of being able to assess the
dynamics of an existing framework, with established properties, without needing to extend
the framework and hence prove its properties still hold. Furthermore, existing extensions
and applications of a framework could, in principle, adopt such a model without needing
to extend a new version of the framework.
Combining the approaches of Rotstein et al. and Cayrol et al. provides a solution
— taking an existing system of structured argumentation and modelling its dynamics
based on the effects of making changes to the system, without extending the system to
accommodate the model of dynamics, combines the advantages of both approaches. This
is what Argument Revision does, resulting in a more general, applicable and expressive
model for revising a system of argumentation.
5Argument dynamics are also important in argument-based dialogues, if the partici-
pants in the dialogue are to fully understand the impact of conceding statements to their
opponent(s), and/or retracting statements they have previously made. When statements
are conceded or retracted, there is not only an impact on what has already been expressed
in the dialogue, but also on potential future utterances. Consider as a high-level example
a participant conceding ¬P to an opponent, when they actually believe (but have not yet
uttered) P ; the concession means that if they wish to remain consistent, they cannot utter
P later in the dialogue (unless the future course of the dialogue allows ¬P to be retracted).
Another application of argument dynamics in dialogue occurs when a participant is
open to dishonesty. Instead of conceding a statement to their opponent, a participant
could offer a counter-argument that they don’t actually believe. While dishonesty does
not involve revision of actual beliefs, it requires the participant to present an epistemic
state that (if the liar is to be dialogically successful) consistently accommodates the source
of the dishonest utterance. This allows dishonesty to be considered a form of belief (or
argument) revision, where beliefs are put through a revision process with respect to the
dishonest statement to yield what the participant must externally appear to believe. This
process is summarised in Figure 1.1. In the context of argument dynamics, the participant
would need to assess, and be aware of, the implications of accommodating the argument at
the source of the dishonesty in whatever framework is being used as the source of their
beliefs.
Furthermore, the formal account of lying specified by Sakama et al. [2010] requires
that dishonest acts be kept ‘minimal” with respect to beliefs so as to reduce the chances of
the dishonesty being exposed. This again results in a natural link to the AGM model of
belief revision, which is guided by the notion of minimal change; a minimal dishonest act
is the one that results in the minimal change between actual and externally-presentable
beliefs.
Given these two applications, assessing dynamics can be considered a strategic tool
in a dialogue, in that it allows a participant to carefully plan its next move, both in terms
6Actual 
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Figure 1.1: Revision process for dishonesty
of the locution and its content, through assessing the impact of that move on current
and potential future commitments and, in the case of dishonest, external perceptions of
its beliefs. These dialogical applications provide a further advantage of decoupling the
model of dynamics from the framework for argumentation to which it is applied. Basing a
dialogue on a framework that has a built-in model of dynamics would remove the strategic
edge, since the model would be available to all participants. However, a decoupling allows
each participant to individually determine whether or not to assess dynamics, and indeed
each may employ different models, which yield different results. In effect, the model for
dynamics is a component used to process the framework as opposed to an intrinsic part of
it.
1.3 Research hypothesis
The research hypothesis upon which this thesis is based is as follows:
A model of Argument Revision can be developed that is applied to, but
remains independent of, an existing system of argumentation, which in turn
can be deployed as a strategic tool in multi-agent dialogue.
The system of argumentation that will be used in answering this hypothesis is the
ASPIC+ framework characterised by Prakken [2010]. ASPIC+ instantiates the abstract
7approach to argumentation specified by Dung [1995] by combining the work of Pollock
[1987] on defeasible reasoning with the work of Vreeswijk [1997] on the structure of
arguments.
ASPIC+ is chosen for several reasons:
1. It is a system of structured argumentation (as opposed to purely abstract) with certain
proven properties, which provides the ability to explore the effect of dynamics on
the structure of arguments, and the properties of the system as a whole.
2. The use of two types of inference rule (strict and defeasible, based on Pollock’s
[1987] theory of defeasible reasoning) presents an opportunity to investigate rule-
based argument dynamics (i.e. revision of arguments based on the rules they apply).
3. Being based on Dung’s theory, it takes advantage of existing, established accept-
ability semantics for evaluation. This allows for investigation into links between
dynamics and acceptability.
4. From an applications perspective, an established link exists between ASPIC+ and
concrete, linguistic argumentation [Bex et al., 2010, 2013], meaning that, in principle,
the work presented in this thesis can be applied to real argument data.
However, the use of ASPIC+ is also in many ways for illustrative purposes only; the
intention of the thesis is to show that the dynamics of existing systems of argumentation
can be examined through a separate, decoupled model without needing to redefine or
extend the system to accommodate the model.
1.4 Thesis structure
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 consists of a review of related literature,
intended to place the work in context with respect to argumentation, belief revision and
multi-agent dialogue, and to survey the existing connections between them. Chapter 3
8contains formal definitions for the system of structured argumentation that is used in
the thesis, as well as specifying new meta-level extensions to the system. A dialogue
framework for a simple persuasion dialogue is specified in Chapter 4, which is subsequently
used to illustrate the application of the model for Argument Revision. This chapter also
introduces a running example, which is picked up again later in the thesis. The core of
this work is the model for Argument Revision, which is specified in Chapter 5. Chapter 6
returns to and continues the running example by illustrating the use of Argument Revision
in the context of dialogue. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and identifies potential
areas for future work.
9Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a review of related literature and is designed to place the thesis in con-
text, in terms of argumentation, belief revision, multi-agent dialogue and the connections
that exist between them.
The chapter is structured such that the three areas of argumentation, belief revision
and dialogue will first be examined individually, with the final section exploring existing
connections between them.
2.2 Argumentation
Argumentation is a multi-disciplinary field, attracting contributions from computer scien-
tists, philosophers (e.g. [Walton, 1998, Reed and Tindale, 2010], discourse analysts and
legal experts (e.g. [Bench-Capon and Prakken, 2010, Bex, 2011]). Work on argumentation
ranges from the exploration of linguistic models of argument, including argument analysis
using tools such as such as Araucaria [Reed and Rowe, 2004], OVA [Snaith et al., 2010] or
Rationale [van Gelder, 2007], to the investigation of abstract, mathematical models, such as
Dung [1995] abstract frameworks. However, recent work has seen the distinction between
natural and abstract argumentation blurred, with the Argument Interchange Format (AIF)
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[Chesn˜evar et al., 2006, Reed et al., 2008, Rahwan and Reed, 2009] serving as a bridge
between concrete, linguistic analyses and abstract, computational models.
Computational models of argument have found a rapid increase in popularity in recent
years, thanks in part to the successful COMMA series of conferences [Dunne and Bench-
Capon, 2006, Besnard et al., 2008, Baroni et al., 2010, Verheij et al., 2012]. In this section,
an emphasis will be placed on computational models of argument, specifically the work of
Dung [1995] and subsequent extensions and applications to this theory.
2.2.1 Argumentation Frameworks
The work of Dung [1995] has proved highly influential in the field of argumentation. In
his paper, Dung provides an abstract account of argumentation, consisting of two sets: a
set of arguments, and a set of attack relations between them. No consideration is given to
internal structure, nor the nature of attacks between arguments.
At the core of the theory is an argumentation framework.
Definition 2.2.1 Argumentation Framework
An argumentation framework is a pair AF = 〈AR,Atts〉, where:
• AR is a set of arguments
• Atts ⊆ AR× AR, a set of attacks
If for some pair of arguments A,B ∈ AR, (A,B) ∈ Atts, we say that A attacks
B, which we shall subsequently denote as Atts(A,B). A visual representation of an
argumentation framework is shown through Example 2.2.1.
Example 2.2.1 Consider an argumentation framework AF = 〈AR,Atts〉 , with:
• AR = {a, b, c, d, e}
• Atts = {(a, a), (b, c), (c, b), (d, c), (e, d)}
This is rendered visually in Figure 2.1
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a
b
c
e
d
Figure 2.1: Framework for Example 2.2.1
Argument acceptability
The usefulness of argumentation frameworks comes from the notion of argument accept-
ability. Acceptability of arguments in frameworks is a cornerstone of Dung’s work and,
broadly speaking, describes a concept of consistency — given an argumentation frame-
work, what arguments are consistent with each other, with respect to the attack relations
between them?
A variety of different acceptability semantics exist (and will be explored later in this
section), but all depend on the concept of a conflict-free set of arguments.
Definition 2.2.2 Conflict-free sets
A set S of arguments if conflict-free iff @A,B ∈ S such that (A,B) ∈ Atts.
In example 2.2.1, it can be seen that the sets ∅, {b}, {c}, {d}, {e}, {b, d}, {c, e} and
{b, e} are all conflict-free. However, this in itself is not very useful, because unless an
argument attacks itself (as in the case of a in the example), it will always appear in at least
one, possibly singleton, conflict-free set. A definition of acceptability is therefore used to
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refine the idea of conflict-freeness.
Definition 2.2.3 (Argument acceptability)
An argument A ∈ AR is acceptable with respect to a set of arguments S iff for each
argument B ∈ AR, if B attacks A then B is attacked by S. A conflict-free set of arguments
is admissible iff each argument in S is acceptable with respect to S.
Remark 1 Some authors, such as Caminada [2007a], characterise acceptability as a
function, F (Args) = {A | A is defended by Args}
In example 2.2.1, the sets ∅, {b}, {c}, {e}, {c, e} and {b, e} are all admissible. Two
conflict-free sets, {c} and {d} are not admissible because c is attacked by d and there is
no argument φ ∈ {c} such that φ attacks d; similarly, d is attacked by e and there is no
argument φ ∈ {d} such that φ attacks e.
Having identified those sets that are admissible, the next step in argument evaluation
is determining what arguments are acceptable with respect to the framework as a whole.
This is achieved through various sceptical and credulous acceptability semantics. When a
framework is evaluated under a certain semantics, one or more admissible sets of arguments
are yielded, which conform to the properties of the chosen semantics. Each set of arguments
is known as an extension.
All semantics are ultimately based on complete semantics. A set of arguments S is a
complete extension if all arguments that are acceptable with respect to S belong to S.
Definition 2.2.4 (Complete semantics) An admissible set S of arguments is called a
complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable with respect to S belongs to S.
Remark 2 Using the function-based notation of Caminada [2007a], if F (S) = S, S is a
complete extension (i.e. it is a fixed point).
In example 2.2.1, {e}, {c, e} and {b, e} are complete extensions; ∅, {b} and {c} are
not complete extensions (despite being admissible sets) because {e} is not attacked by
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any argument, and is therefore defended by any set of arguments. This means it must be a
member of every complete extension.
Complete semantics on their own are of limited use, because they yield multiple
extensions with no consideration for maximality. As can be seen in example 2.2.1, {e}
is a complete extension, but this ignores that when e is acceptable, either b or c (but not
both) is also acceptable. Furthermore, it is also useful in certain applications (such as when
abstract frameworks are used as a basis for beliefs) to have only one extension. To address
these shortcomings, complete semantics are further refined into other semantics; while
Dung [1995] provides formal definitions of these, it is convenient to summarise them as in
definition 2.2.5.
Definition 2.2.5 (Acceptability semantics)
A conflict-free set of arguments S is:
• Admissible if S ⊆ F (S)
• A complete extension if S = F (S)
• A preferred extension if S is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) complete
extension
• The grounded extension if S is the minimal (with respect to set inclusion) complete
extension
• A stable extension if S attacks every argument in AR\S
In example 2.2.1, the preferred extensions are {b, e} and {c, e} and the grounded
extension is {e}. Note that there is no stable extension, because for a set of arguments S to
be a stable extension, it must be conflict-free and defeat every argument not in the extension.
However, because argument a is self-defeating, it cannot appear in any conflict-free set
and thus no such set exists that defeats every argument that is not a member of it.
This shows a significant drawback of stable semantics, in that they do not take relevance
into consideration — a interacts with no arguments other than itself, but prevents any stable
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extension from existing. Caminada [2006] proposes a solution to this problem through
defining semi-stable semantics.
Definition 2.2.6 (Semi-stable semantics)
Let AF = 〈AR,Atts〉 be an argumentation framework and for some S ⊆ AR, S+ be the
set of all arguments defeated by S. S is a semi-stable extension if S is a complete extension
and S ∪ S+ is maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
Returning again to example 2.2.1, the semi-stable extensions are {b, e} and {c, e}.
In later work, Caminada [2007a] argues that further new acceptability semantics are
needed to resolve the dilemma of certain semantics, such as preferred, yielding more than
one extension. While one solution to this problem involves taking the intersection of
the multiple extensions, in this approach the properties of the individual extensions are
lost. Furthermore, in some semantics, such as preferred, taking the intersection (known as
“sceptical-preferred”) can result in a set which is not admissible. This was identified by
Dung et al. [2007], and illustrated using the framework shown in Figure 2.2.
a
b
c
d
Figure 2.2: Framework illustrating the problem with sceptical-preferred semantics
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There are two preferred extensions in this framework {a, d} and {b, d}, with the
sceptical-preferred extension being {d}. However, {d} is not admissible, because d is
attacked by c and there is no other argument in the set that defends d from c. Resolving
this problem leads to ideal semantics:
Definition 2.2.7 (Ideal semantics)
The ideal extension is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set that is a subset of
each preferred extension
In Figure 2.2, the ideal extension is ∅, because {d} is not admissible and there exists
no other set that is a subset of both preferred extensions. It is proven by Dung et al. [2007]
that the ideal extension, in common with all other extensions examined in this section, is a
complete extension.
Similar to ideal semantics, Caminada [2007a] defines eager semantics, in terms of
semi-stable semantics:
Definition 2.2.8 (Eager semantics)
The eager extension is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set that is a subset of
each semi-stable extension
Alternative approaches to solving the problem of multi-extension semantics have also
been proposed. These will be examined in section 2.2.2.
2.2.2 Extensions, instantiations and implementations of Dung [1995]
Dung’s [1995] work has proven highly significant in computational argumentation, illus-
trated by the considerable and varied body of work that has either extended it, or used it as
a foundation. In this section, some of these extensions and instantiations will be explored.
Preferences
While Caminada [2007a] believes that the problem of multi-extension semantics can be
resolved through defining new semantics, an alternative approach is to apply preferences to
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arguments. In a preference-based approach, the success or otherwise of an attack depends
on the attacking argument not being less-preferred to the attacked argument1.
The first attempt at applying preferences to Dung-style frameworks was made by
Amgoud and Cayrol [1997], where they develop a Preference Argumentation Framework
(PAF) in which values are applied to arguments. Each argument holds a different value,
with higher-valued arguments being more preferred to those with lower values. A similar
approach is adopted by Bench-Capon and Dunne [2002] in their Value-based Argumen-
tation Frameworks (VAFs), however a key difference between PAFs and VAFs is that
the latter allows different arguments to hold the same value. A PAF can, therefore, be
considered a special form of a VAF where each argument has a different value.
VAFs are defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.9 (Value-based Argumentation Frameworks)
A Value-Based Argumentation Framework (VAF) is a tuple
V AF = 〈AR,Atts, V, val, valpref〉 where:
• AR and Atts are the same as found in Dung’s framework
• V is a non-empty set of values
• val is a mapping between AR and V
• valpref is a preference relation expressing which values are preferred over others
A criticism of value-based approaches is the question of how the values are arrived at.
Modgil [2009a,b] provides an answer to this question through Extended Argumentation
Frameworks, where instead of applying values to arguments, preference arguments are
introduced that can attack the attacks between arguments.
1Note that this does not correspond to the attacking argument being more preferred — in some frameworks,
the two arguments can hold equal preference and the attack succeeds, provided the attack is only in one
direction.
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Definition 2.2.10 (Extended Argumentation Framework)
An Extended Argumentation Framework is a tuple EAF = 〈AR,Atts,D〉 where AR and
Atts are the same as found in Dung’s framework and:
• D ⊆ AR× Atts
• If (z, (x, y)), (z′, (y, x)) ∈ D then (z, z′), (z′, z) ∈ Atts
Remark 3 The second condition states that two arguments which attack opposing attacks
also attack each other.
An advantage of Modgil’s approach is that the preferences are themselves arguments
(in AR), which allows preferences to be attacked in the same way as “normal” arguments.
Bipolarity
Amgoud et al. [2008] believe that a drawback of Dung’s theory is its failure to capture
the idea of support. This prompted them to specify Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks
(BAFs) which introduce a new support relation between arguments.
Definition 2.2.11 (Bipolar Argumentation Framework)
A bipolar argumentation framework is a tuple BAF = 〈AR,Atts, R〉 where AR and
Atts are the same as found in Dung’s framework and R ⊆ AR× AR, a support relation
between arguments.
Thus if (a, b) ∈ R, we say that a supports b.
The idea of support used in BAFs has come under criticism, as noted by Oren [2007].
However, he also argues in his thesis that despite these criticisms, support can play an
important role when, for instance, considering evidence in an argumentation framework.
The ASPIC and ASPIC+ frameworks
Instantiations of Dung’s theory involve using it as the basis for less abstract frameworks.
One such instantiation is the ASPIC+ framework characterised by Prakken [2010] which
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extended the original ASPIC framework of [Amgoud et al., 2006]. The ASPIC+ framework
incorporates structured arguments through combining the work of Vreeswijk [1997] with
the work of Pollock [1987] on defeasible reasoning (see section 2.2.3).
The ASPIC+ framework extends the original ASPIC framework in four ways:
1. The addition of a third way of attack — undermining
2. Abstracting the notion of contradiction between formulae to an abstract notion of
contrariness, which is not necessarily symmetric (i.e. φ may be a contrary of ψ, but
not vice versa)
3. The introduction of a knowledge base, with four types of premise
4. The introduction of preference orderings over the knowledge base and defeasible
rules, which in turn leads to a preference ordering over arguments
The majority of the work presented in this thesis will be based on the ASPIC+ frame-
work, and as such the relevant formal definitions are provided in Chapter 3, along with
other important logical preliminaries. However, informally, the fundamental basis of the
framework is an Argumentation System, AS = 〈L,− ,R〉, where L is a logical language,
− is a function from L to 2L representing contrariness between formulae andR is a set of
strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules.
Prakken [2010] proves that, under certain assumptions, the ASPIC+ framework satisfies
Caminada’s [2007a] rationality postulates:
• Closure under subarguments: for every argument in an extension, all its subargu-
ments are also in the extension
• Closure under strict rules: the set of conclusions of all arguments in an extension
is closed under strict-rule application
• Direct consistency: the set of conclusions of all arguments in an extension is
consistent
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• Indirect consistency: the closure of the set of conclusions of all arguments in an
extension under strict-rule application is consistent
For these postulates to hold for ASPIC+, Prakken assumes that an argumentation theory
is well-formed. The formal definition of this is provided in Chapter 3, but informally an
argumentation theory is well-formed iff (i) no formula is the consequent of an axiom; or
(ii) no formula is the consequent of a strict rule.
A significant advantage of the ASPIC+ framework is that, given a set of structured
arguments, a Dung-style abstract framework can be derived then evaluated using the
standard semantics. This allows the acceptability of structured arguments to be ascertained.
A recent development by Bex et al. [2010, 2013] connected the Argument Interchange
Format (AIF) [Chesn˜evar et al., 2006] to ASPIC+, allowing real, analysed arguments
expressed in the former to be translated into the logical concepts of the latter. This allows
for the first time real, textual arguments to be analysed under Dung-style semantics in
order to evaluate their acceptability.
The ASPIC+ framework has received criticism from Amgoud [2012], who claims that
it has five weaknesses, summarised as follows:
• The logical formalism is ill-defined
• The system may thus lead to undesirable results
• The system is grounded on several assumptions which may appear counter-intuitive
• The system may violate the rationality postulates on closure and direct consistency
• The system returns results which may not be closed under classical logic
Prakken and Modgil [2012] respond to these claims by providing counter-examples
to the criticisms levied. The main principle of this response is focused on the nature of
ASPIC+ as a framework for specifying systems, and not a system itself. This means,
Prakken and Modgil argue, that instantiating the framework in a way that violates the
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rationality postulates (as Amgoud has done) demonstrates the aim of ASPIC+ — to
determine whether a certain instantiation satisfies or violates the postulates.
The ASPIC+ framework has subsequently been extended and generalised by Modgil
and Prakken [2013], however the work presented in this thesis will continue to use the
framework as specified by Prakken [2010].
Other applications
In this section, other areas in which Dung’s theory has been used are briefly examined.
Devereux and Reed [2009] and Devereux [2011] employ Dung-style argumentation
frameworks as the basis for agent knowledge bases. In this work, the grounded extension
was used as a simple means of deriving an agent’s beliefs from an underlying framework,
with beliefs defined simply in terms of arguments (e.g. if {a, b} is the grounded extension
of an argumentation framework, the agent believes {a, b}). This principle can be extended
using the ASPIC+ framework, such that instead of an agent believing the arguments in an
extension, they believe the conclusions of those arguments, which will be a set of formulae
in a language.
The abstract nature of Dung’s work has seen it applied in areas where there exist
some kind of entities (not necessarily arguments) and conflict between them. For instance,
Bulling et al. [2009] use argumentation frameworks to model coalition structures in multi-
agent systems, with the arguments representing agents, the attacks representing conflict
between them and the acceptability semantics yielding possible coalitions (i.e. a set of
agents (arguments) in a certain extension can form a coalition).
Implementations
The prominence of Dung’s abstract frameworks has given rise to implementations of several
systems based on the work. South et al. [2008] implemented Dungine, a Java-based rea-
soner that allows Dung-style frameworks to be constructed then evaluated under grounded,
preferred and preferred-sceptical semantics. Similar to Dungine is OVA-gen [Snaith et al.,
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2010], which provides an online interface for constructing abstract frameworks, which can
then be evaluated under several different semantics, including grounded, preferred, ideal
and semi-stable using algorithms based on those of [Vreeswijk, 2006, Caminada, 2007b,
Dung et al., 2007].
Finally, TOAST [Snaith and Reed, 2012] is an online implementation of ASPIC+,
which shares a reasoning engine with OVA-gen. TOAST allows structured argumentation
frameworks to be constructed using a simple propositional language and evaluated under
a number of semantics. A connection between TOAST and the AIFdb [Lawrence et al.,
2012b], using the work of [Bex et al., 2010, 2013], allows real arguments represented in the
Argument Interchange Format to be processed using Dung-style acceptability semantics.
2.2.3 Defeasible argumentation
Defeasible reasoning was introduced by Pollock [1987] and divides rules of inference into
two types: strict and defeasible. Informally, if a rule is strict, it holds without exception; if
a rule is defeasible, it usually holds, but there may be some, possibly unknown, exceptional
circumstances in which it does not.
A classic example used to illustrate the idea of defeasible reasoning is that of tweety
the bird [Reiter, 1980].
Example 2.2.2 Consider the following knowledge base, where⇒ represents a defeasible
rule and→ represents a strict rule:
K =

bird(X)⇒ flies(X),
penguin(X)→ bird(X),
penguin(X)→ ¬flies(X),
penguin(tweety)

If we were to compute inferences over this knowledge base, we would arrive at two
conclusions: that tweety, being a penguin, does not fly; but also that tweety, being a
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penguin and hence a bird, does fly. However, while it is the case that, strictly, all penguins
are birds and, strictly, all penguins do not fly, that “all birds fly” is only defeasible — that
is, it is only in general that birds fly, but there are some exceptions (in this case, where the
bird is a penguin).
Defeasible reasoning has found applications in computational models of argument. An
insight into the use of defeasible reasoning in various systems of argumentation is provided
by Prakken and Vreeswijk [2002]. One of their main observations is the way in which
different systems handle defeasible consequence, which in some cases leads to unintuitive
results.
More recently, Garcı´a and Simari [2004] specify Defeasible Logic Programming
(DeLP), a formalism that combines defeasible reasoning with logic programming. Given a
set of information, DeLP performs a dialectical analysis to determine whether or not there
is a warranted argument for a given query, q. An argument is warranted if it is not defeated
by another argument in the dialectical analysis.
As noted in Section 2.2.2, the ASPIC+ framework incorporates defeasible reasoning
in providing structure to Dung [1995]-style argumentation frameworks. Similar to DeLP,
rules in ASPIC+ are categorised into strict and defeasible, with the latter being susceptible
to undercutting, an attack by an argument that says the rule does not presently apply.
In both systems (DeLP and ASPIC+), defeasibility is necessary for conflict to be
resolved in all but the most trivial of examples. In DeLP, a strict argument for a certain
conclusion will defeat a defeasible argument for a contradictory conclusion; in ASPIC+,
strict arguments are, in general, stronger than defeasible arguments and thus are preferred.
2.3 Belief revision
Belief revision is the study of how a knowledge base is updated when removing existing
information, accommodating new information or a combination of both. One of the most
influential theories of belief revision is the eponymous AGM theory of [Alchourro´n et al.,
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1985], where they propose the AGM Postulates for what they consider to be three types of
change that can be made to a knowledge base:
Expansion: a new sentence Φ is added to a belief system K, together with its logical
consequences. This is denoted as K + Φ.
Revision: a new sentence Φ that is inconsistent with K is added, but further changes are
made such that consistency is maintained. This is denoted as K+˙Φ
Contraction: a sentence Φ in K is retracted without adding any new sentences. To
maintain closure under logical consequences, some other sentences may need to be
given up. This is denoted as K−˙Φ
The Levi identity [Levi, 1977] allows revision to be expressed in terms of contraction
and expansion, where K+˙Φ = (K−˙¬Φ) + Φ.
One of the main principles of belief revision is that of minimal change — when
changing a belief set, it should be done with the fewest changes to the remaining or
existing information. However, minimal change is not measured solely in terms of logical
consequences [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, 1992]; instead, a qualitative entrenchment ordering is
applied to beliefs, with those beliefs that possess the lowest degree of entrenchment being
more willingly given up. As will be explored later in this section, however, this approach
to minimality has a significant drawback.
2.3.1 AGM Postulates
The AGM Postulates, named after Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [Alchourro´n
et al., 1985], govern the process of revising and contracting belief sets. Expansion does
not require any postulates, because the process is self-evident — a belief set is expanded
by adding the new sentence to it, with no consideration of the effects (e.g. causing
inconsistency).
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There are eight postulates each for revision and contraction, which are shown in tables
2.1 and 2.2 respectively, where K⊥ is shorthand for “K is consistent” and ` Φ is shorthand
for “Φ is logically possible”.
(K+˙1) The outputs of the revi-
sion function are belief
sets
K+˙Φ is a belief set
(K+˙2) The input sentence Φ is
accepted in K+˙Φ
Φ ∈ K+˙Φ
(K+˙3) Defined together and
cover the case ¬Φ /∈ K
K+˙Φ ⊆ K+˙Φ
(K+˙4) If¬Φ /∈ K, then K + Φ ⊆ K+˙Φ
(K+˙5) K+˙Φ is consistent K+˙Φ = K⊥ iff ` ¬Φ
(K+˙6) Revisions are based on
the knowledge level and
not the analytic
If ` Φ↔ Ψ, then K+˙Φ = K+˙Ψ
(K+˙7) The minimal change of
K by Φ and Ψ is
K+˙Φ ∧Ψ
K+˙Φ ∧Ψ ⊆ (K+˙Φ) + Ψ
(K+˙8) If ¬Ψ /∈ K+˙Φ, then (K+˙Φ) + Ψ ⊆
K+˙Ψ ∧ Φ
Table 2.1: AGM postulates for revision
(K−˙1) The outputs of the revi-
sion function are belief
sets
K−˙Φ is a belief set
(K−˙2) No new beliefs occur in
K−˙Φ
K−˙Φ ⊆ K
(K−˙3) When Φ /∈ K, nothing is
retracted
If Φ /∈ K, K−˙Φ = K
(K−˙4) K−˙Φ 6` Φ If not ` Φ, then Φ /∈ K−˙Φ
(K−˙5) The recovery postulate;
contractions can be ‘un-
done’
If Φ ∈ K, then K ⊆ (K−˙Φ) + Φ
(K−˙6) Contractions are based on
the knowledge level and
not the analytic
If ` Φ↔ Ψ, then K−˙Φ = K−˙Ψ
(K−˙7) The minimal change of
K by Φ and Ψ is
K−˙Φ ∧Ψ
K−˙Φ ∩K−˙Ψ ⊆ K−˙Φ ∧Ψ
(K−˙8) If Φ /∈ K−˙Φ ∧Ψ, then K−˙Φ ∧Ψ ⊆
K−˙Φ
Table 2.2: AGM postulates for contraction
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2.3.2 Epistemic entrenchment
When carrying out a belief revision process, it is difficult to uniquely specify a revision
function, because each goal (i.e. revision or contraction) may have multiple ways through
which it can be achieved [Ga¨rdenfors, 1992]. One of the ways in which a method can be
chosen is to examine what brings about the minimal change to a belief set.
In the AGM theory, minimal change is not measured solely in terms of logical conse-
quences, but also employs a qualitative entrenchment ordering over beliefs — those beliefs
with a lower degree of entrenchment are more willingly given up; in other words, giving
them up is considered minimal.
Epistemic entrenchment is governed by five postulates [Ga¨rdenfors, 1992]:
(EE1) If Φ ≤ Ψ and Ψ ≤ χ, then Φ ≤ χ (transitivity)
(EE2) If Φ ` Ψ, then Φ ≤ Ψ (dominance)
(EE3) For any Φ and Ψ, Φ ≤ Φ ∧Ψ or Ψ ≤ Φ ∧Ψ (conjunctiveness)
(EE4) When K 6= K⊥, Φ /∈ K iff Φ ≤ Ψ, for all Ψ (minimality)
(EE5) If Ψ ≤ Φ for all Ψ, then ` Φ (maximality)
Table 2.3 provides the justifications that Ga¨rdenfors [1992] gives for (EE2)-(EE5)
((EE1) is not provided with justification, because transitivity is obvious).
That the entrenchment ordering is qualitative is a significant drawback and represents a
major issue in belief revision, because for an autonomous agent in a dynamic environment,
it is not clear how new information can be accommodated in the entrenchment ordering.
There may be some form of evaluation criteria built into the agent’s reasoning mechanisms,
but this assumes a closed-world principle, in which the agent is aware of every piece of
information that may be presented to it. While this may be adequate in systems with very
narrow applications, it is insufficient when considering, for instance, virtual participants on
the proposed Argument Web [Rahwan et al., 2007] where, even if a debate is limited to a
specific topic, in principle the exact information received by agents can vary considerably.
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(EE2) “...if Φ logically entails Ψ, and either Φ or Ψ must be re-
jected from K, then it will be a smaller change to give up
Ψ and retain Φ rather than to give up Ψ, because Φ must be
retracted too...”
(EE3) “If one wants to retract Φ ∧ Ψ from K, this can only be
achieved by giving up either Φ or Ψ and, consequently, the
information loss incurred by giving up Φ ∧ Ψ will be the
same as the loss incurred by giving up Φ or that incurred by
giving up Ψ.”
(EE4) “...sentences already not in K have minimal epistemic en-
trenchment in relation to K...”
(EE5) “...only logically valid sentences can be maximal in ≤.”
Table 2.3: Justifications for (EE2)-(EE5)
2.4 Dialogue
A dialogue is a discussion of some kind between two or more participants2. The dialogue
typology of Walton and Krabbe [1995] details six dialogue types, with each type having
an initial situation, a main goal (the purpose of the dialogue) and individual goals (what
each participant aims to achieve from the dialogue).
The initial situation in persuasion dialogue is one of conflict, where two or more
participants take a contrary opinion. The main goal of this dialogue is to resolve the
conflict, with the individual goal of each agent being to have their opinion accepted.
A negotiation dialogue starts with a need for co-operation, with a main goal of making
a deal. The individual goal of each agent is to get the best possible deal for itself.
An inquiry dialogue arises out of general ignorance, and has as its main goal the
growth of knowledge (consider real-life inquires, such as those carried out by the police
or judiciary). Each agent’s individual goal is to either find or destroy a proof which will
ultimately influence the outcome of the inquiry.
A deliberation dialogue has a need for action as its initial situation and its main goal
is to reach a decision on which action to take. The goal of each agent is to influence the
outcome.
2While “dialogue” might suggest exactly two participants, in the context of philosophical and computa-
tional models of dialogue, this is extended to “two or more”.
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An information-seeking dialogue starts from a position of general ignorance, and
aims to spread knowledge. Each agent’s individual goal is to spread or hide knowledge.
The sixth and final dialogue in Walton & Krabbe’s typology is “Eristics”, which is
analogous to physical fighting. In the context of multi-agent systems research, this dialogue
can be overlooked.
2.4.1 Dishonesty in dialogue
Lying can be considered a fundamental human behaviour, however research into its
use in artificial intelligence is somewhat limited. Sklar et al. [2005] provide a model
for contradiction in dialogue, which allows a participant to support an argument with
information they might not believe. The question of “why lie?” is answered with several
scenarios; one is that offering an acceptable argument for a lie q that supports the statement
p is (somehow) easier than finding an acceptable argument for p.
Sakama et al. [2010] look to provide a formal account of lying, by specifying what
they see as three types of dishonesty:
• Lying: the process of uttering a believed-false statement with the intention that the
hearer believes it, and believes that the speaker believes it
• Bullshit: (henceforth referred to as “BS”) the process of uttering a statement that
is neither believed to be true nor false, with the intention that the hearer believes it,
and believes that the speaker believes it.
• Deceit: the process of uttering a statement that is believed-true, but with the intention
that the hearer uses it to draw a false conclusion
One of the key elements of Sakama et al.’s specification of dishonesty is that dishonest
acts must be kept as small as possible so as to reduce the risk the dishonesty being exposed.
The size of dishonesty is measured in terms of the impact on other beliefs — lying (in the
formal sense) is uttering the opposite of something you believe (e.g. uttering ¬φ when φ is
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believed), so anything that is a consequence of that belief (e.g. if φ ` ψ) or that belief is
a consequence of (e.g. θ ` φ) will be unavailable to the participant later in the dialogue,
unless they can use another dishonest act to cover it up.
2.4.2 Dialogue in multi-agent systems
Multi-agent systems (MASs) are software systems built from multiple autonomous agents,
which each have their own goals, and the ability to control their behaviour in achieving
them [Wooldridge, 2001]. Communication between agents in a MAS is vital if the overall
goal of the system is to be reached, with computational accounts of philosophical dialogues
having been identified as one such means of communication.
The work of Parsons and Jennings [1996], Reed [1998] and McBurney and Parsons
[2002] laid the groundwork for specifying computational protocols for argumentative
inter-agent communication. Parsons and Jennings [1996] specify a formal protocol for
negotiation between agents looking to find ways to solve problems, while Reed [1998]
provides a computational account of the Walton and Krabbe [1995] dialogue typology
(with the exception of eristics, which models physical conflict) and McBurney and Parsons
[2002] formalised the modelling of dialogue games for agent communication.
2.5 Argumentation, belief revision and dialogue
In this section, existing connections between argumentation, belief revision and dialogue
are explored.
2.5.1 Argumentation and dialogue
Connections between argumentation and dialogue are long-established thanks to the close
link between two forms of argument — argument-as-product, which is sets of premises
and inferences leading to conclusions, and argument-as-process, which is two or more
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participants engaging in an argumentative dialogue (which in turn can lead to an argument-
as-product structure).
From a philosophical standpoint, Walton [1998] illustrates how argument is employed
in many dialogue types, and can be used to contribute to the goals of the dialogue. As noted
in section 2.4.2, many computational dialogue games based on systems of argumentation
have been specified, based (at least in part) on the Walton and Krabbe [1995] typology.
Work by Parsons and Jennings [1996], Reed [1998] and McBurney and Parsons [2002],
laid the groundwork for specifying computational protocols for argumentative inter-agent
communication.
Prakken [2005] specifies a framework for argumentative dialogue and shows that
dialogues based on it implicitly build an argument structure, which can be used to evaluate
certain properties of the dialogue. This returns to the link between argument-as-process
and argument-as-product.
More recently, persuasion dialogues have been specified by Devereux and Reed [2009],
Devereux [2011], based on Walton and Krabbe’s PPD, and uses Dung [1995] style abstract
argumentation frameworks as a source of agent beliefs, and content of locutions.Weide
and Dignum [2011] specify a simple persuasion dialogue based on Prakken’s [2005]
framework, and use the ASPIC+ framework as the basis of beliefs and the content of
locutions.
While persuasion appears to be the most popular dialogue type in argumentation, since
it models most closely the idea of “having an argument”, Black and Hunter [2007, 2009]
specify a computational protocol for an inquiry dialogue using argumentation. An inquiry
dialogue aims to establish a truth or find new knowledge, instead of one party trying to
persuade the others to accept their position.
2.5.2 Argumentation and Belief Revision
The aim of belief revision is to resolve inconsistencies that may arise when accommodating
new information in a belief set. The idea of inconsistency in argumentation is not clearly
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defined, although some authors such as Besnard and Hunter [2008] do consider it, because
the argumentation machinery should deal with statements or arguments that are in conflict
with one another.
However, this does not preclude connections between argumentation and belief revision.
Such connections can trace their roots to the Truth Maintenance System of Doyle [1979],
which allows for beliefs to be represented and consistency restored if required, but more
recently the exploration of connections has found new momentum, with two approaches to
combining the fields having emerged. One is the use of argumentation to assist with belief
revision, such as the work of Kru¨mpelmann et al. [2012] on using deductive argumentation
to perform selective revision [Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999, Falappa et al., 2012], or the work
of Falappa et al. [2002] that uses defeasible reasoning and explanation in non-prioritized
belief revision (where input sentences are not necessarily accepted [Hansson, 1999]);
the other is the use of belief revision concepts to model the dynamics of argumentation
systems, such as in Argument Theory Change [Rotstein et al., 2008].
Falappa et al. [2009, 2011] further develop the connections between argumentation and
belief revision by developing a conceptual view of the topic. This conceptual view is first
defined by four steps of reasoning:
• Receiving new information: new information can be in many forms, e.g. a proposi-
tional fact or an argument,
• Evaluating new information: Upon receipt of new information, an agent will evaluate
it in order to be convinced it is true. If the information is an observation, truth is
usually assumed. However, if it is communicated by another agent, some justification
will be required.
• Changing beliefs: If the agent chooses to accept the information, it will apply belief
revision techniques to incorporate it into its knowledge base
• Inference: From its new epistemic state, the agent derives plausible beliefs that guide
its behaviour
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Referring to these as “steps” implies that each is a distinct process, following on from
the previous one. However, it is possible there may be overlap: for instance, one could
consider the evaluation of new information as being a series of tests, each of which must
pass for the information to be evaluated as being acceptable to the agent. One of these tests
could be a determination of the impact (with respect to minimal change) this information
would have on the agent’s current beliefs — the initial steps of actually accommodating it.
The overall conclusions from Falappa et al.’s work is that argumentation and belief
revision should not be seen as competing alternatives, but instead seen as complimentary;
combining the two allows for a richer modelling of the reasoning process.
Two applications of belief revision to argumentation will be now be briefly examined.
Change in abstract argumentation
Cayrol et al. [2010] specify change operators for Dung-style argumentation frameworks,
in terms of the effects of adding an argument and its interactions (i.e. attacks) to the
framework. The changes are defined in terms of the effect on the set of extensions (under
unspecified semantics) in the framework and are summarised in Table 2.4.
A key principle in the specification of Cayrol et al.’s change operators is that their
determination is based on existing, quantifiable effects on the system of argumentation,
in this case Dung-style abstract frameworks. They do not depend on modifications to the
system that are specific to modelling and assessing change.
Argument Theory Change
Argument Theory Change (ATC) is an argumentation framework whose dynamics are
captured through the application of belief change operators [Rotstein et al., 2008, Mogu-
illansky et al., 2010]. ATC is an extension to Dung’s (1995) theory by incorporating
subarguments and a set of active arguments (those arguments that are available to perform
reasoning). So if an argument is activated (i.e. becomes available for consideration), the
set of active arguments is further modified to make this argument warranted.
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Property for a change operation Characterisation of the property
the change is decisive E = ∅ or E = {∅} or | E |> 2
and | E ′ |= 1 and E ′ 6= {∅}
the change is restrictive | E |>| E ′ |> 2
the change is questioning | E |<| E ′ |
the change is destructive E 6= ∅ and E 6= {∅}
E ′ = ∅ or E ′ = {∅}
the change is expansive | E |=| E
′ | and
∀εji ∈ E ′, ∃εi ∈ E, εi ⊂ εji
the change is conservative E = E ′
the change is altering | E |=| E
′ | and
∃εi ∈ E s.t. ∀εij ∈ E ′, εi 6⊆ εij
Table 2.4: Structural properties for a change operation, from [Cayrol et al., 2010]
The basis for Argument Theory Change is a Dynamic Argumentation Framework:
Definition 2.5.1 A dynamic abstract argumentation framework (DAF) is a tuple
〈U, ↪→,v〉 [A ], where U is a finite set of arguments called universal, A ⊆ U is called the
set of active arguments, ↪→⊆ U× U denotes the attack relation and v⊆ U× U denotes
the subargument relation
Remark 4 U, ↪→ and v are considered static, while A is dynamic.
ATC can be broadly described as the process of adding an argument to a theory,
then applying belief revision techniques to make that argument warranted. Different
approaches to bringing about the warrant are available, such as through activating defeaters
[Moguillansky et al., 2010].
A limitation of ATC is that a model of dynamics is built in to the framework, and as
such it is defined over a set of universal arguments, which is every argument that could
be made available for reasoning in the system. This is sufficient for specific applications
with limited domains where all possible arguments are known (for instance, reasoning
about a certain medical condition), however in dialogical applications, while restricting the
dialogue to a certain domain is not altogether unreasonable, a shared knowledge between
the participants of all possible arguments limits the dialogue somewhat; for instance, it
33
would be difficult for a participant to implement certain strategies if their opponents were
already aware of every possible argument.
2.5.3 Belief revision and dialogue
Despite what appear to be obvious connections, the overlap between belief revision and
dialogue remains under-researched. Zhang et al. [2004] consider a negotiation dialogue
as a form of mutual belief revision, where each participant examines and evaluates the
others’ beliefs as part of the process of reaching the goal. A similar technique is also
used by Pilotti et al. [2012], where belief revision is used for the generation, selection and
evaluation of arguments in a negotiation dialogue.
In certain protocols based on the Walton and Krabbe [1995] typology, each participant
has a commitment store, to which utterances and concessions are added, and from which
retractions are removed. As Girle [1997, 2002] identifies, a commitment store is like a
belief set and as such the processes of incurring and retracting commitment can be seen as
analogues for, respectively, expansion (or revision) and contraction.
In the dialogue game PPD0 [Walton and Krabbe, 1995], when a participant retracts
a statement from their commitment store, they must also retract any other statements
of which the retracted is a consequence, in a process known as a stability adjustment.
However, what is not made clear is that, when a choice of addition retractions exist (e.g. if
P,Q ` R and R is retracted, which out of P or Q is also retracted), what criteria should
be used to choose between them? There is, again, a natural link back to belief revision —
perform the retraction that brings about the minimal change.
2.6 Summary and discussion
This chapter has provided a review of relevant literature connected to argumentation, belief
revision and dialogue.
In the case of argumentation, specific focus was made on computational models,
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specifically Dung’s [1995] abstract frameworks, along with their subsequent instantiations,
extensions and applications. Belief revision, meanwhile, focused on the AGM model
[Alchourro´n et al., 1985], its concept of minimal change and why the traditional method of
determining it is insufficient.
When looking at existing connections between argumentation and belief revision, two
broad approaches are evident — the use of argumentation in assisting the belief revision
process (such as the use of deductive argumentation to select a revision [Kru¨mpelmann
et al., 2012]) and the application of belief revision principles to systems of argumenta-
tion to model their dynamics (such as Argument Theory Change [Rotstein et al., 2008,
Moguillansky et al., 2010]).
While the modelling of argument dynamics through belief change operators appears
to have a solid foundation, what appears to be under-researched is a decoupling of the
model for argument change from the framework to which it is applied. For instance, Argu-
ment Theory Change defines a new argumentation framework (“Dynamic Argumentation
Framework”), with the revision operations being a part of it. Defining a new framework
that incorporates its model of dynamics does have advantages; for instance, it allows the
framework to be specified with the need to model dynamics in mind, which in turn can give
a more specific determination of concepts such as minimal change. However, being able to
model the dynamics of existing frameworks, without modifying them to incorporate the
model, also has its benefits; from a theoretical perspective, it allows existing frameworks
with established and proven properties to have their dynamics modelled without needing
to modify the framework itself, which carries the risk of changing its properties. In terms
of applications, decoupling the model of dynamics turns it into an additional, optional tool
for processing the framework. This allows, for instance, a dialogue to be based on the
framework, with some participants examining dynamics and others not.
What is perhaps most striking is the lack of research into the connections between
dialogue and belief revision, despite the obvious overlaps between the dynamics of com-
mitment stores [Walton and Krabbe, 1995] and the dynamics of belief sets [Ga¨rdenfors,
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1988, 1992], a link that appears to have been noted only by Girle [1997, 2002], but without
any further significant action.
Commitment stores are, by Walton and Krabbe’s definition, dynamic — as a dialogue
progresses, each participant’s store is updated, either through adding new statements,
or removing previous ones, with the latter (in certain protocols) also incorporating a
stability adjustment, where statements that allow the retracted statement to be concluded
are also given up. The latter situation in particular represents an area well-suited to the
application of belief revision techniques. While Walton and Krabbe describe what a
stability adjustment is, and its intention, no consideration is given to how it should be
performed, and if multiple possibly adjustments exist, which should be chosen. Considering
this problem in the context of belief revision, it can be framed thus: when faced with the
need to retract, what is the minimal set of retractions that i) removes the required statement
and ii) prevents that statement from being inferred in the new commitment store?
It is also possible that a participant in a dialogue does not want to concede a statement to
their opponent. If a concession requires a contraction and subsequent stability adjustment,
it may be that any possible adjustment has a significant effect on remaining commitments,
and potential future statements in the dialogue. So other options beyond concession and
retraction must be considered, to give the participant a choice.
One such option is to be dishonest. Dishonesty is an important, but under-researched
topic in artificial intelligence [Sakama et al., 2010], because it represents a fundamental
human behaviour. Sakama et al.’s logical account of lying places importance on “minimal
lies” — tell only those lies that have a minimal impact on other beliefs, because those
are the easiest to maintain. This concept of minimality also has obvious links to belief
revision; if dishonesty were considered a form of belief revision (and so a revision process
is performed with respect to the source of the dishonesty), then minimal change can be
used as a means of determining minimal lies.
In Chapter 5 a model for argument revision is specified which addresses the issues
identified in this review. The model is decoupled from the framework for argumentation
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whose dynamics it captures, removing the need to respecify the framework and, subse-
quently, ensure its properties are maintained. In terms of dialogue, the model provides a
participant with the ability to assess the impact of a concession then subsequent retraction,
or dishonest act to continue defending their position.
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Chapter 3
Logical preliminaries
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce two important foundations that the remainder of
the thesis shall build upon and use. The first is the ASPIC+ framework [Prakken, 2010], an
abstract framework for argumentation that instantiates the work of Dung [1995] by giving
arguments structure. The second foundation is the provision of an extension to ASPIC+ to
incorporate meta-argumentation.
3.2 The ASPIC+ framework
Instantiations of Dung’s 1995 abstract theory of argumentation involve using it as the
basis for less abstract frameworks. One such instantiation is the ASPIC+ framework
characterised by Prakken [2010], which also extended the work of the ASPIC project
[Amgoud et al., 2006] and the work of Caminada and Amgoud [2007]. The ASPIC+
framework incorporates structured arguments, through combining the work of Vreeswijk
[1997] with the work of Pollock [1987] on defeasible reasoning.
The ASPIC+ framework extended the original ASPIC framework in four ways:
1. The addition of a third way of attack — undermining
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2. Abstracting the notion of contradiction between formulae to an abstract notion of
contrariness between formulae, which is not necessarily symmetric (i.e. φ may be a
contrary of ψ, and yet not the reverse)
3. The introduction of a knowledge base, with four types of premise
4. The introduction of preferences between arguments, defeasible inference rules (see
[Pollock, 1987]) and the knowledge base.
The fundamental notion of the ASPIC+ framework is an argumentation system:
Definition 3.2.1 An argumentation system is a tuple AS = 〈L,− ,R,≤〉 where:
• L is a logical language
• − is a contrariness function from L to 2L
• R = Rs ∪ Rd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules such that
Rs ∩Rd = ∅
• ≤ is a partial pre-order onRd
Remark 5 Given two formulae φ, ψ ∈ L, the notation φ ∈ ψ means “φ is a contrary of ψ
and the notation φ = −ψ means “φ and ψ are contradictory” (i.e. φ ∈ ψ and ψ ∈ φ).
A defeasible inference rule is a rule that usually holds, however there may be some
exceptional circumstances where it does not; a strict inference rule is a rule that always
holds, without exception.
An argumentation system contains a knowledge base, whose elements are formulae of
the language L:
Definition 3.2.2 A knowledge base in an argumentation system 〈L,− ,R,≤〉 is a pair
〈K,≤′〉 where:
• K ⊆ L
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• K = Kn ∪ Kp ∪ Ka, with:
– Kn being a set of (necessary) axioms
– Kp being a set of (ordinary) premises
– Ka being a set of assumptions
• ≤′ is a partial pre-order on K\Kn
From the knowledge base (K) and rules (R), arguments are constructed. For an
argument A, Prem(A) is a function that returns all the premises in A; Conc(A) is a
function that returns the conclusion of A; Sub(A) is a function that returns all the sub-
arguments of A; DefRules(A) is a function that returns all defeasible rules in A; and
TopRule(A) is a function that returns the last inference rule use in A.
A can be one of three types, and these functions in each case are:
1. When A = ϕ, for ϕ ∈ K, with:
• Prem(A) = {ϕ}
• Conc(A) = ϕ
• Sub(A) = ϕ
• DefRules(A) = ∅
• TopRule(A) = undefined.
2. When A = A1, . . . ,An → ψ A1, . . . ,An such that there exists a strict rule
Conc(A1), . . . Conc(An)→ ψ inRs with:
• Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Prem(A2)
• Conc(A) = ψ
• Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}
• DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪DefRules(An)
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• TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→ ψ.
3. When A = A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ψ for arguments A1, . . . ,An such that there exists a
defeasible rule Conc(A1), . . . Conc(An)⇒ ψ inRd with
• Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Prem(A2)
• Conc(A) = ψ
• Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}
• DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪DefRules(An)
• TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ ψ.
Arguments are classified based on their rules and premises:
Definition 3.2.3 An argument A is:
• strict if DefRules(A) = ø
• defeasible if DefRules(A) 6= ø
• firm if Prem(A) ⊆ Kn
• plausible if Prem(A) 6⊆ Kn
That is, an argument is strict if it has no defeasible rules, or defeasible otherwise, and
an argument is firm if its premises consists only of axioms, or plausible otherwise.
An argument can be attacked in three ways: on a (non-axiom) premise (undermine), on
a defeasible inference rule (undercut) or on a conclusion (rebuttal).
Given an argumentation system AS and a knowledge base KB, an argumentation
theory isAT = 〈AS,KB,〉 where is an argument ordering on the set of all arguments
that can be constructed from KB in AS . An argumentation theory is well-formed iff: if φ
is a contrary of ψ then ψ /∈ Kn and ψ is not the consequent of a strict rule [Modgil and
Prakken, 2011].
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Preferences over arguments are used to determine whether or not an attack succeeds
(i.e. results in a defeat). Preference orderings are based on an idea of being “reasonable”,
which in turn is based on maximal fallible sub-arguments:
Definition 3.2.4 (Maximal fallible sub-arguments)
For any argument A, an argument A′ ∈ Sub(A) is a maximal fallible sub-argument of
A if:
1. A′’s final inference is defeasible, or A′ is a non-axiom premise; and
2. there is no A′′ ∈ Sub(A) such that A′′ 6= A, A′ ∈ Sub(A) and A′′ satisfies
condition (1)
Remark 6 For an argument A, M(A) is its maximal fallible sub-arguments.
Definition 3.2.5 (Reasonable argument orderings)
LetA andB be arguments with contradictory conclusions such thatB ≺ A. If the argument
ordering  is reasonable then there exists a Bi ∈ M(B) and an A+ with A ∈ Sub(A+)
such that Conc(A+) = −Conc(Bi) and A+ 6≺ Bi
Finally, ASPIC+ defines several closure operators, two of which will be used in this
thesis. Firstly, closure under transposition:
Definition 3.2.6 (Transposition)
A strict rule s is a transposition ofϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ψ iff s = ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1,−ψ, ϕi+1, . . . , ϕn →
−ϕi for some 1 ≤ ı ≤ n.
Definition 3.2.7 (Closure under transposition)
LetRs be a set of strict rules. Cltp(Rs) is the smallest set such that:
• Rs ⊆ Cltp(Rs), and
• If s ∈ Cltp(Rs) and t is a transposition of s, then t ∈ Cltp(Rs).
42
If Cltp(Rs) = Rs,Rs is closed under transposition.
Secondly, the closure of a set of formulae under strict rule application:
Definition 3.2.8 (Closure of a set of formulae)
Let P ⊆ L. The closure of P under the set Rs of strict rules, denoted ClRs(P ), is the
smallest set such that:
• P ⊆ ClRs(P )
• if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ψ ∈ Rs and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ ClRs(P ) then ψ ∈ ClRs(P )
3.3 Meta-argumentation
In meta-argumentation, statements and reasoning can be made about arguments them-
selves. Modgil [2009a] employs meta-level argumentation as a means of reasoning about
preferences in argumentation frameworks, which Modgil and Prakken [2010] combined
with [Prakken, 2010] to allow for reasoning about preferences in structured argumenta-
tion frameworks. In all this work, preferences between arguments themselves become
meta-level arguments.
Weide and Dignum [2011] also use meta-argumentation with the ASPIC+ framework,
only their model is not limited only to preferences. In their work, rules and arguments
themselves can be elevated as meta-level arguments. However, their definition of a meta-
argumentation system does not require that arguments about object-level concepts exist in
the associated meta-level system; the only constraint is that the meta-language subsumes the
object-level language, and also contains every object-level rule and argument as formulae.
Preferences (between rules and formulae) and conflict are not part of the meta-language
and thus arguments about them cannot be constructed. Furthermore, a binary predicate, ,
is explicitly added to the meta-language as a means of reasoning about conclusive force.
This approach to meta-argumentation has several drawbacks:
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1. There is no requirement that object-level rules and arguments have corresponding
arguments in a meta-argumentation system; all that is specified is that rules and argu-
ments are a part of the meta-language. This limits the ability of meta-argumentation
to be used to reason about the object-level system, because there is no guarantee that
a given component at the object-level is represented by a meta-argument.
2. The addition of the binary predicate  to the meta-language is redundant, because
preferences between arguments are already expressed at the object-level. Instead
of introducing a new predicate, preferences can be represented at the meta-level to
convey the same meaning.
In spite of these drawbacks, the general principle of representing object-level com-
ponents (rules, preferences, contrariness and arguments) as formulae of a meta-language
provides several advantages. Such advantages include the ability to reason about, and
provide justification for, object-level components, and representing existing concepts such
as undercutting in ways that do not place assumptions on the object language.
Consider as an example the following information about whether or not a person who
is ill should visit their doctor.
If you are ill, you should visit your doctor. However, if you are ill and have
the flu, it does not follow that you should visit your doctor. This is because flu
is contagious and you could infect others.
If we were to encode this in ASPIC+, we can easily represent the first sentence as a
rule: [r1] ill ⇒ go to doctor. The second sentence represents an exception to the rule
(Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3), which Prakken [2010] represents as rules, by first assuming rule
labels can be represented in the object language L: [r2] have flu⇒ ¬[r1].
However, this exception has justification (“flu is contagious. . . ”), which has no way
of being represented. This is the role played by meta-argumentation — the exception
becomes a formula in a meta-language which then allows it to be reasoned about in the
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same way as formulae in the object language. Furthermore, as will be shown in Definitions
3.3.2 and 3.3.3, meta-argumentation also allows for a representation of exceptions that do
not depend on rule labels being represented in the object language.
In expanding ASPIC+ to account for meta-arguments, we address the shortcomings
of Weide and Dignum [2011]’s approach by defining a meta-argumentation system as not
being derived from an object-level argumentation system, but instead through a series of
bijections, where components of the object-level system must be represented by a (possibly
atomic) argument in the meta-level system, and arguments in the meta-level system result
in components of the object-level system.
It should be stressed at this point that the purpose of this thesis is not to contribute
significantly to the study of meta-argumentation, but will instead only be using it as a
tool in dialogue and argument revision. Thus the process through which an object-level
component becomes a meta-level argument, and vice versa, will be left implicit.
Definition 3.3.1 (Meta-argumentation)
Given an object-level argumentation systemAS i = 〈Li,Ri, cfi,≤i〉 and a meta-argumentation
system AS i+1 = 〈Li+1,Ri+1, cfi+1,≤i+1〉:
• Li ⊆ Li+1
• A ∈ Args(AS i)↔ dAe ∈ Li+1
• r ∈ Ri ↔ ∃A ∈ Args(AS i+1) s.t. Conc(A) = dre
• φ ∈ ψ in AS i ↔ ∃A ∈ Args(AS i+1) s.t. Conc(A) = dφ ∈ ψe
• φ <′ ψ in AS i ↔ ∃A ∈ Args(AS i+1) s.t. Conc(A) = dφ < ψe
• r1 < r2 in AS i ↔ ∃A ∈ Args(AS i+1) s.t. Conc(A) = dr1 < r2e
• A1  A2 in AS i ↔ ∃A ∈ Args(AS i+1) s.t. Conc(A) = dA1  A2e
Definition 3.3.1 allows for either components of an object-level argumentation system
to be derived from arguments in a meta-level system, or arguments in a meta-level system
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to be deduced from the components of an object-level system. In broad terms, given a
component Φ, of unspecified type, in an object-level argumentation system, there is an
argument (that is possibly atomic) for dΦe in the corresponding meta-level argumentation
system; conversely, if there is an argument with conclusion dΨe in a meta-level argumen-
tation system, Ψ is a component (of whichever type) in the corresponding object-level
argumentation system. Since it is not the intention of this thesis to contribute to meta-
argumentation, but instead use it as a device in argument revision, the actual process of
deducing meta-level arguments and object-level components will be left implicit, based on
the structure of the components themselves.
Preferences between arguments can be calculated based on preferences between their
non-axiom premises and/or defeasible rules. This, in principle, means that at the meta-
level, arguments for the premise and rule preferences can combine in order to generate the
argument preferences, either as an argument or as some form of joint attack (on an object
level attack from a less-preferred to a more-preferred argument). However, characterising
this would again be beyond the scope of this thesis, thus it is assumed that argument
preferences are computed at the object-level, with the appropriate representation (i.e.
A ≺ B) being elevated as a meta-level argument, which then provides the source of the
attack.
Using meta-argumentation provides several advantages for argument revision. Firstly,
every component of an argumentation system becomes an argument, whether this be at
the object- or a meta-level. This allows for a single method of revising arguments to
be specified, which can then be applied to the meta-level arguments for ground-level
components (i.e. rules, preferences and contrariness). This, in turn, allows the ground-level
arguments to be revised using these components.
A further advantage of using meta-argumentation in argument revision is that it allows
us to introduce a principled characterisation of the distinction between strict and defeasible
rules. Recall that a rule is defeasible iff there exists some exceptional circumstance(s) in
which that rule cannot be applied; otherwise, it is strict. Note that it does not need to be the
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case that the source of the exception is currently true (or, in the context of an argumentation
theory, there does not need to exist an acceptable argument with a conclusion that is the
source of the exception) — all that needs to exist is the declaration that if this formula
is true, the rule does not apply. Using meta-argumentation, we formally redefine the
distinction between strict and defeasible rules by stating that a ground rule is strict iff its
meta-level representation has no contraries at the meta-level; otherwise, it is defeasible.
Definition 3.3.2 (Strict and defeasible rules)
r ∈ Rs(AS i)↔ @φ ∈ Li+1 s.t. φ ∈ dre
r ∈ Rd(AS i)↔ ∃φ ∈ Li+1 s.t. φ ∈ dre
In an argument revision context, this characterisation allows strict rules to be revised
into defeasible rules by introducing a contrary with respect to the rule (again, without
necessarily introducing the formula that is the contrary). Conversely, a defeasible rule can
be revised into a strict rule by removing its contraries. The process and properties of rule
revision will be described in more detail in Chapter 5.
In a broader context, representing rules as meta-arguments has a further advantage. It
allows for a more precise definition of undercutting, that does not depend on Prakken’s
[2010] assumption that rules can be represented in the object language of an argumentation
system. Instead, a defeasible rule is represented in the language of a meta-argumentation
system where, per definition 3.3.2, it will have at least one contrary (in order to be
defeasible). If there then exists an argument for a contrary in the ground system, the
rule is undercut (possibly not successfully) by that argument. We thus formally redefine
undercutting, in terms of meta-argumentation, thus:
Definition 3.3.3 (Undercutting)
An argument A ∈ Args(AS i) undercuts an argument B ∈ Args(AS i) (on B′ ∈ Sub(B))
iff Conc(A) ∈ dTopRule(B′)e in AS i+1
In other words, an argument A undercuts an argument B (on a sub-argument B′) if and
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only if the conclusion of A is defined in the meta-level argumentation system as being
contrary to the meta-level representation of the topmost rule in B′.
To return to the example presented on p.43, given Definitions 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 we
can now encode the information as follows:
• [r1] ill⇒ go to doctor (rule at the object level)
• have flu ∈ dill⇒ go to doctore (contrary at the first meta level)
• [r2]flu is contagious⇒ dhave flu ∈ dill⇒ go to doctoree (rule at the second
meta-level)
As can be seen, using meta-argumentation allows the justification for the exception to
be represented, while also removing the need to represent rule labels in the object-level
language.
To represent the set of all (meta-) argumentation systems, the notation of Weide and
Dignum [2011] is employed, which describes a tower of argumentation systems:
Definition 3.3.4 (Tower of Argumentation Systems)
A tower of argumentation systems of level 1 ≤ n is a set {AS1, . . . ,ASn} such that:
• AS1 is an argumentation system and
• for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n: AS i is a meta-argumentation system for AS i−1
Given a tower of argumentation systems, a meta-argumentation theory is defined, again
from Weide and Dignum [2011]:
Definition 3.3.5 (Meta-argumentation theory) A Meta-Argumentation Theory (AT ) is a
tuple 〈TAS , {K1, . . . ,Kn},〉 such that:
• TAS = {AS1, . . . ,ASn} is a tower of argumentation systems of level n, and
• for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n: Ki is a knowledge base in argumentation system AS i
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•  is an argument ordering on the set of all arguments that can be constructed from
each knowledge base in each AS
In subsequent sections and chapters, unless made otherwise explicit, the phrase “ar-
gumentation theory” and the notation AT will refer to a meta-argumentation theory. The
symbol Π shall be used to represent the set of all possible argumentation theories.
A core feature of ASPIC+ is the ability to derive a Dung-style abstract framework from
an argumentation theory. This allows structured arguments and the relations between them
to be evaluated using established acceptability semantics for abstract argumentation. An
abstract framework derived from an argumentation theory uses the arguments in the theory
as the set of arguments, and successful attacks (defeat) in place of the attack relation.
When using meta-argumentation, an ordinary Dung-style framework cannot be derived,
because of the extra levels of attack afforded — for instance, attacks on attacks (through
an attack on a preference of contrariness relation). Modgil and Prakken [2010] introduced
the idea of attacks on attacks in abstract argumentation, through the use of Extended
Argumentation Frameworks (EAFs). Weide and Dignum [2011] provide a definition of
how to obtain an EAF from an ASPIC+ meta-argumentation theory, which is employable
in the present work:
Definition 3.3.6 (Structured EAF)
EAF = 〈A, C,D〉 is a bounded hierarchical EAF, where A = Args(AT ) and:
• (A1,A2) ∈ C if A1 attacks A2.
• if ∃A1,A2 ∈ A s.t Conc(A2) = dr : ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕe andConc(A1) ∈ Conc(A2),
then (A1,A2) ∈ C and ∀A3 ∈ A s.t. r ∈ DefRules(A3), (A1,A3) ∈ C
• ∀(A1,A2) ∈ C, if ∃A3 ∈ A s.t. Conc(A3) ∈ dConc(A1) ∈ Conc(A2)e, then
(A3, (A1,A2)) ∈ D and ∀A4 ∈ A s.t. A4 ∈ Sub(A2), (A3, (A1,A4)) ∈ D
• ∀(A1,A2) ∈ C, if ∃A3 ∈ A s.t. Conc(A3) = dA1 ≺ A2e, then (A3, (A1,A2)) ∈ D
and ∀A4 ∈ A s.t. A4 ∈ Sub(A2), (A3, (A1,A4)) ∈ D
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The second and third parts of definition 3.3.6 introduce not only an attack on the
attack between A1 and A2, but also the attack by A1 on any arguments in which A2 is a
sub-argument.
In the ASPIC+ framework, when an abstract framework is derived, it uses the notion
of defeat in place of attack (with a defeat being an attack which is successful, w.r.t.
preferences). However, when using meta-argumentation, preferences and attacks become
arguments which can themselves be attacked. An EAF, therefore, reverts to the use of attack,
with defeat being parametrised with respect to preference, specified by a set S of arguments
[Modgil and Prakken, 2010]: Y →S X iff (Y,X) ∈ C and @Z ∈ S s.t. (Z, (Y,X)) ∈ D.
In other words, an argument Y defeats an argument X iff there exist an attack on X by Y
and there is no argument Z in S that attacks the attack.
Acceptability in EAFs differs from that found in a standard Dung AF. This definition is
also taken from [Modgil and Prakken, 2010]:
Definition 3.3.7 (EAF acceptability)
Given an Extended Argumentation Framework EAF = 〈A, C,D〉, let S ⊆ A. Let NS =
{X1 →S Y1, . . . , Xn →S Yn} where for i = 1 . . . n, Xi ∈ S. Then NS is a reinstatement
set for A →S B iff A →S B ∈ NS , and ∀X →S Y ∈ NS,∀Y ′ s.t. (Y ′, (X, Y )) ∈ D,
∃X ′ →S Y ′ ∈ NS
X is acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆ A iff ∀Y s.t. Y →S X , there is a reinstatement set for some
Z →S Y .
Given definition 3.3.7, extensions are defined in the same way as for a standard Dung
AF [Dung, 1995].
3.4 Summary
This chapter has introduced two important foundations upon which the rest of the thesis
will build. The ASPIC+ framework of [Prakken, 2010] was first introduced, before going
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on to define meta-level extensions to it. The meta-level extensions elevate object-level
components (conflict, rules and preferences) to meta-level arguments, and differs from
previous work on meta-argumentation in dialogue [Weide and Dignum, 2011] by mandating
that every object-level component be represented by a corresponding meta-level argument.
Definitions were then provided from [Modgil and Prakken, 2010] for the derivation, and
evaluation of an extended argumentation framework from a meta-argumentation theory.
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Chapter 4
Dialogue framework: SPD
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a dialogue framework is presented in which the participants use a system
of structured argumentation to formulate locutions. The framework, named SPD (Simple
Persuasion Dialogue), describes a communication language and protocol for a persuasion
dialogue, with the former being specified on the basis of the ASPIC+ framework.
Weide and Dignum [2011] previously specified a dialogue protocol based on the
ASPIC+ framework, defined in terms of meta-argumentation systems and designed with
the intention of allowing participants to reason and argue about preferences between
arguments. The framework was specified in terms of towers of meta-argumentation
systems; a meta-argumentation system being an argumentation system that describes
another argumentation system, and a tower being a set of these, where the system ASn
describes the system ASn−1.
Weide and Dignum’s protocol has two significant drawbacks; the first is that its claim
locution is defined over ASPIC+ arguments and not formulae of the logical language. Thus
if an agent possess an argument for some conclusion φ, it must, from the definition of an
argument (see [Prakken, 2010], as outlined in Chapter 2), claim its entire argument for it.
This presents two disadvantages: firstly, it can result in relatively trivial dialogues, where
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one participant claims an argument and his opponent claims another argument that defeats
it — there is no scope to claim only the conclusion and initiate a claim-challenge-defend
process as found in other protocols, such as those specified by Walton and Krabbe [1995].
The second drawback is the inability of the protocol to generate a new argumentation
theory that is not simply the combination of parts of those from which the participants’
formulated their locutions. By allowing arguments to be broken up and reconstructed as
part of a dialogical process, we can end up with what are essentially new arguments, with
new interactions (i.e. attacks and defeat).
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, the concepts of shared and personal argumen-
tation theories, and their role in a dialogue, are introduced; a communication language,
inspired by that of Weide and Dignum [2011], is then presented, with key differences high-
lighted. Finally, commitment and structural rules are specified, with the former dictating
how the commitments of dialogue participants are updated, and the latter governing how a
dialogue begins, progresses and terminates.
4.2 Personal and shared argumentation theories
Before specifying the dialogue framework itself, the concept of personal and shared
argumentation theories is first introduced.
4.2.1 Personal argumentation theory
Each participant engaging in an SPD dialogue will possess a personal argumentation
theory, from which they will determine belief for the purposes of advancing locutions in the
dialogue. For a participant α, their personal argumentation theory is represented as PAT α.
Each participant’s personal argumentation theory will contain at least one argumentation
system. Furthermore, participants will share a common language at each meta-level, i.e.
for two participants α and β, the language of AS i in PAT α is the same as the language of
AS i in PAT β . However, it is not required that each personal argumentation theory extend
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to the same meta-level — so for instance, PAT α may contain n argumentation systems,
while PAT β may contain m, with n 6= m. However, for the purposes of specifying SPD,
we assume that the topmost language in all personal argumentation theories is Ln, which
subsumes all lower-level languages.
From its personal argumentation theory, a participant derives its beliefs. For the
purposes of this work, we shall assume that all participants are sceptical and thus will
use grounded semantics as the method of evaluating the abstract framework. Grounded
semantics are also chosen because they yield a unique extension and determining the nature
of belief based on multi-extensional semantics is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Definition 4.2.1 (Participant beliefs)
Given a personal argumentation theory PAT α for a participant α, α’s beliefs are Bα =
ClRs({Conc(A) | A ∈ EG(PAT α)}), where ClRs is the strict rule closure operator
(Chapter 3, p.42, Definition 3.2.8) and EG(PAT α) is the grounded extension of the
abstract framework derived from PAT α.
That is, a participant believes the conclusion of all arguments in the grounded extension
of the framework derived from its personal argumentation theory, as well as anything that
can be inferred from it under strict rule application.
Private arguments and beliefs
A participant in a dialogue may wish to avoid uttering certain information they believe.
For instance, in a real domain, a politician may wish to keep private an opinion that does
not garner much public support, or a researcher might not wish to reveal unpublished
results from a study. Alternatively, at a more abstract level, if we were using a value-based
argumentation framework [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2002], if an argument A promotes
some negative value v, then a participant may wish to keep it private.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore the nature of what constitutes
private arguments and, by extension, beliefs, and the criteria used in determining them,
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we still capture the concept for use in SPD, and to illustrate an application of argument
revision in Chapter 6. For now, we assume that a participant in a dialogue has a set of
acceptable arguments P ⊆ EG(PAT ) which, using some criteria, they have determined
to be “private”.
If an argument is private, then any arguments in which it is a sub-argument should also
be marked as private. We capture this through the definition of a closure operator, Clp.
Definition 4.2.2 (Private argument closure)
Let Pα be a set of private arguments. Clp(Pα) is the smallest set such that:
• Pα ⊆ Clp(Pα)
• ∀A ∈ Clp(Pα),A′ ∈ EG(PAT α), if A ∈ Sub(A′), A′ ∈ Clp(Pα)
Given the closure of a participant’s private arguments, we now define their communica-
ble beliefs, which is a set of all conclusions of non-private arguments.
Definition 4.2.3 (Communicable beliefs)
Let Pα be a set of private arguments. The communicable beliefs of α are:
Bcα = ClRs({Conc(A) | A ∈ EG(PAT α)}\Clp(Pα))
Note that it is not necessarily the case that Bcα = Bα\{Conc(A) | A ∈ Clp(Pα)}.
This is because there may exist more than one argument with the same conclusion in
EG(PAT α), but when deriving belief, the distinction between arguments is lost and only
one instance of the conclusion is passed into Bα. Thus in order to maintain all non-private
conclusions, we need to return to the arguments themselves to derive the communicable
beliefs.
4.2.2 Shared argumentation theory
During a dialogue, the participants will construct a shared argumentation theory, denoted
as AT D. The shared theory will contain as many argumentation systems and knowledge
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bases as are required to reflect the current meta-level of the dialogue; for instance, if an
entire dialogue is conducted only at the object-level, the shared theory will contain only one
argumentation system and associated knowledge base. However, if the dialogue contains
elements at the meta-level, it would contain two argumentation systems and knowledge
bases (at the meta-meta-level it would contain three and so on).
The shared theory has two purposes:
• To provide a monological account of the dialogue
• To provide an assessment of the acceptability of the arguments advanced in the
dialogue
Providing a monological account of the dialogue allows the arguments expressed to be
analysed and evaluated post-dialogue. This provides an overall view of everything that
was advanced and, ultimately, the outcome.
Assessing the acceptability of arguments during the dialogue allows the participants
to assess what their next locution should be. For instance, if a participant finds that an
argument they previously advanced is defeated in the shared system, they can either offer
a defence for it, or be forced into retracting it by their opponent. This process will be
explained further by the structural rules of the dialogue (section 4.5).
The construction of the knowledge bases of the argumentation systems in AT D is
closely connected to commitment, and the structure of the dialogue. This will be elaborated
in the commitment and structural rules (sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively).
4.3 Communication language
In this section, the communication language for SPD is specified. The communication
language defines the valid locutions, and the content thereof, that a participant can make.
Definition 4.3.1 (Communication language)
A communication language LC for a language Ln is:
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• ∀Φ ∈ 2Ln: claim(Φ), why(Φ), concede(Φ), resolve(Φ) ∈ LC
• ∀Φ ∈ 2Ln ,Ψ ∈ 2Ln s.t. Φ ∩Ψ = ∅, retract(Φ,Ψ) ∈ LC
The content of each locution is a set of formulae of the ASPIC+ language Ln, with
the exception of retract which has two sets as its content — the first is the formula to be
retracted, while the latter is a (possibly empty) set of justifications for the retraction. The
concept of justified retractions will be explained further in section 4.4.2.
Locutions are advanced as part of a move. Moves contain an identifier, the participant,
the locution and a timestamp.
Definition 4.3.2 (Dialogue move)
A dialogue move is a tuple, m = 〈id, pl, loc, t〉 where:
• id ∈ N the ID of the move
• pl ∈ P , the participant
• loc ∈ LC , the locution, including its content
• t ∈ N, the target of the move
For notational convenience, each element of a move is provided with a corresponding
function which returns the value of that element in the move. For instance, for a move
m1 = 〈1, α, claim(φ), 0〉:
• id(m1) = 1
• pl(m1) = α
• loc(m1) = claim(φ)
• t(m1) = 0
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A dialogue consists of a topic, a communication language, a set of participants and a
set of moves. To represent a dialogue, we use notation similar to that of Reed [1998] and
Weide and Dignum [2011]:
Definition 4.3.3 (Dialogue)
A dialogue is a tuple D = 〈τ,LC ,P ,M〉, where:
• τ ∈ Ln is the topic of the dialogue
• LC is a communication language on the basis of definition 4.3.1
• P is a set of participants
• M is a set of moves on the basis of definition 4.3.2
4.4 Commitment and commitment rules
As a dialogue progresses, participants incur commitment to formulae they claim and
concede. In this section, the structure of a participant’s commitment store and the rules
governing how commitment is incurred are specified.
4.4.1 Commitment store
A commitment store is a representation of everything to which a participant has become
committed during a dialogue. Commitment is incurred when a participant makes a claim
and when they concede a claim made by an opponent.
Definition 4.4.1 (Commitment store)
The commitment store of a participant α ∈ P at time t in a dialogue is Ctα, such that
Ctα ⊆ Ln
A commitment store is non-monotonic, in that a participant can retract commitment to
a formula; however, it is possible that their remaining commitments still allow a retracted
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formula to be inferred. To determine whether or not this is the case, we define a closure
operator over commitment stores.
Definition 4.4.2 (Commitment closure)
Let Ctα be a commitment store. ClC(C
t
α) is the smallest set such that:
• Ctα ⊆ ClC(Ctα)
• if dϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ϕe ∈ ClC(Ctα) then if {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ ClC(Ctα), ϕ ∈ ClC(Ctα)
A commitment store is closed iff Ctα = ClC(C
t
α).
From the definition of commitment store closure, notions of direct and indirect con-
sistency are now defined. A commitment store is consistent iff it does not contain two
formulae where one is a contrary of the other (with the contrary relation itself represented
as a formula in the commitment store).
Definition 4.4.3 (Direct consistency)
A commitment store Cα is directly consistent iff for any φ, φ′ ∈ Cα, {φ, φ′, dφ′ ∈ φe} 6⊆ Cα.
Indirect inconsistency requires that the conditions for direct consistency be fulfilled in
the closure of the commitment store.
Definition 4.4.4 (Indirect consistency)
A commitment store Cα is indirectly consistent iff for any φ, φ′ ∈ ClC(Cα), {φ, φ′, dφ′ ∈
φe} 6⊆ ClC(Cα).
4.4.2 Commitment rules
Having now defined what constitutes a commitment store, how it is closed and the condi-
tions under which it becomes inconsistent, the commitment rules of SPD can be specified.
The commitment rules govern how a participant incurs commitment as a dialogue pro-
gresses, based on their locutions. The commitment rules also direct the construction of
the shared argumentation theory, AT D. For notational convenience, AS iD will be used as
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shorthand for “the argumentation system containing the meta-level language to which this
formula belongs”.
The first commitment rule states that when a participant claims a formula, they become
committed to that formula. Additionally, the formula is added to the knowledge base of
the corresponding meta-level argumentation system in ASD.
C1 if loc(mi) = claimα(Φ) then:
• Ciα = Ci−1α ∪ Φ
• Given Φ = Φ1 ∪ Φ2 such that Φ1 ∩ Φ2 = ∅, ∀φ ∈ Φ, if ∃ψ, dφ ∈ ψe ∈
Clc(Ci−1α ) φ ∈ Φ1, else φ ∈ Φ2. Then Ka(AS iD) = Ka(AS i−1D ) ∪ Φ1 and
Kp(AS iD) = Kp(AS i−1D ) ∪ Φ2.
The second effect is stating that if this participant has previously claimed a formula of
which the newly-claimed formula is a contrary (and the contrary relation), the new formula
is added to AT D as an assumption. This will be explained further in the specification of
the structural rules, section 4.5.
As well as updating the knowledge base of an argumentation system in AT D, if a
claimed formula is at the meta-level, the object-level component (rule, preference, con-
trariness) that it represents will be added to the corresponding object-level argumentation
system.
The second commitment rule relates to conceding a set of formulae to an opponent.
C2 if loc(mi) = concedeα(Φ), then Ciα = Ci−1α ∪ Φ
There is no requirement for concede to update AT D, because the formulae will have
already been added as a result of a claim from the opponent.
The final commitment rule describes the process of retraction. A retraction is, in
its simplest form, the opposite of a claim, in that it takes a set of formulae out of the
commitment store. However, it can also add new formulae, in order to justify the retraction.
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C3 if loc(mi) = retractα(Φ,Ψ) then:
• Ciα = (Ci−1α \Φ) ∪Ψ
• ∀ψ ∈ Ψ, if ψ /∈ K(AS iD), Ka(AS iD) = Ka(AS i+1D ) ∪ {ψ}
A retraction does not remove the formulae from the knowledge base of an argumen-
tation system in AT D, because of the deductive monotonicity of AT D. Furthermore, a
retract locution does not remove formulae from the closure of the commitment store — it
is entirely possible that a retracted formula can still be inferred from what remains, which
means the participant should either retract additional formulae, or face being forced into a
further retraction by their opponent.
The second parameter of a retract is a set of formulae that are used to justify the
retraction, if no justification already exists in the participant’s commitment store (as a
result of a concession). A justification involves incurring commitment to a formula that
is a contrary of the retracted formula, along with the associated contrariness relation
(e.g. {φ, dφ ∈ ψe} would justify a retraction of ψ). Note that there is no requirement
for a retraction to be justified, so even if one does not already exist in the participant’s
commitment store, they do not have to provide one in the retract locution.
To distinguish between justified and unjustified retractions, we formally define what
constitutes justification.
Definition 4.4.5 (Justified retraction)
A retraction retract(Φ,Ψ) at step t is justified iff: ∀φ ∈ Φ, then for some ψ: {ψ, dψ ∈
φe} ⊆ ClC(Ct−1 ∪Ψ).
Remark 7 We consider the closure of Ct−1 ∪Ψ and not Ct to ensure that if a justification
is provided in the retract locution, it is considered in the evaluation of justification.
Remark 8 Where a retraction is unjustified, we use a superscript u on the locution:
retractu(Φ,Ψ).
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In other words, a retraction is justified if a justification is present in the closure of the
commitment store following the retract. Formulae expressed in a justification as part
of a retraction are added to the assumptions set of the knowledge base in the relevant
argumentation systems in AT D because there is a (possibly erroneous; see Chapter 6)
assumption of honesty between participants. Thus, if a participant claims a formula, they
are seen as believing it; if they then claim a contrary formula to justify retracting the
original claim, they are seen as having updated their beliefs to assume the contrary is true
(and hence why it is the case their belief no longer holds).
A present constraint in the dialogue framework is that for a retraction to be justified, all
formulae in the retraction must be justified (i.e. have appropriate contraries in the closure
of the commitment store or justification parameter in the locution). It will be left to future
work to investigate the concept of “partial justification”, where justification is provided for
only a proper subset of Φ.
The use of justified retraction will be explained more fully in section 4.5, but generally
speaking if a participant does not justify a retraction, they cannot reclaim the retracted
formula later in the dialogue, even if all other conditions allow for it.
4.5 Structural rules
The structural rules in a dialogue specify the protocol, dictating whose turn it is and what
locutions are valid. The structural rules of SPD are inspired by those of RPD0 [Walton
and Krabbe, 1995]. For simplicity, it will be assumed the dialogue is taking place with
only two participants, P = {α, β}.
The first structural rule describes valid moves following a move with a claim locution.
Following a claim by one participant, the second participant must either question it,
(counter-)claim a contrary or contradictory formula, concede the claimed formula or, if the
claim has caused or failed to resolve an inconsistency, force a resolution.
R1 if loc(mi) = claimα(Φ), there must @m′ ∈ M s.t.pl(m′) = α and loc(m′) =
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retractu(Φ, ∅) and loc(mi+1) must be either:
• whyβ(Φ),
• claimβ({ψ, dψ ∈ φe}), for some φ ∈ Φ, with Kp(AS i+1D ) = Kp(AS iD) ∪
{ψ, dψ ∈ φe}
• concedeβ(Φ)
• resolveβ(Φ)
The initial constraint placed on the content of a claim means that a set of formulae
can be claimed iff it has not been unjustifiably retracted at an earlier point in the dialogue.
We again place a constraint that only a full claim (i.e. all the formulae within it) can be
conceded; “partial concession”, where only a proper subset of the claimed formulae are
conceded, will be left for future investigation.
The second structural rule describes valid moves following a move containing a why
locution. The participant whose claim is questioned can either re-assert the formulae,
justify them with rules, or retract them.
R2 if loc(mi) = whyβ(Φ), then loc(mi+1) must be either:
• claimα(Φ),
• claimα(Φ′), where Φ′ =
⋃
φ∈Φ
{φ1, . . . , φn, dφ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φe}
• retractα(Φ,Ψ)
When a participant concedes, its opponent can either force it to resolve either an incon-
sistency in its commitment store, or a lack of defence of a previous claim. Alternatively,
any other move can be made provided the dialogue has not terminated.
R3 if loc(mi) = concedeα(Φ) then loc(mi+1) must be either:
• resolveβ(Φ′) if for Φ′ ⊆ Φ, ClC(Ciα) is inconsistent w.r.t. Φ′, or ∀φ ∈ Φ′, all
arguments for φ are defeated in AT D
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• any other non-resolve move by β, except in the conditions of R5
The second condition of R3 allows for an inconsistency or lack of defence to go
unchallenged. While all examples provided in this thesis will demand such resolutions,
there is no technical limitation to allowing them to pass and hence the ability is provided
in the protocol.
The fourth rule describes the response to a participant being forced to resolve its
commitment store. This takes the form of a retraction of the formulae at the source of the
inconsistency, while also providing a justification for the retraction, unless the participant
chooses not to provide one, or a justification has already been given earlier in the dialogue.
R4 if loc(mi) = resolveα(Φ) then loc(mi+1) must be: retractβ(Φ,Ψ).
The final rule describes the termination conditions. A dialogue terminates when either
the proponent (α) retracts the topic of the dialogue, or the opponent (β) concedes it. Note
that since concession of the topic by the proponent terminates the dialogue, there is no
requirement for his commitment store to be resolved (i.e. he does not need to perform a
stability adjustment).
R5 a dialogue terminates at move mi if either:
• loc(mi) = concedeβ(τ)
• loc(mi) = retractα(τ).
4.6 Running example
In this section, an example will be presented that will be used not only to illustrate SPD,
but also techniques presented in later chapters.
Consider two participants, P = {α, β}. Each possesses a personal argumentation
theory. The construction of PAT α = 〈{AS1,AS2,AS3}, {K1,K2,K3}〉 is as follows
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(where the letters represent formulae of the language Ln):
Kn(AS1) = {w1, z}
Kp(AS1) =

a1, a2, b1,
c1, c2, e1,
f1, g1, h1,
i

Rd(AS1) =

a1, a2 ⇒r1 a, b1 ⇒r2 b,
c1, c2 ⇒r3 c, e1 ⇒r4 e,
f1 ⇒r5 f, g1 ⇒r6 g,
h1 ⇒r7 h, w1 ⇒r8 w,
a2 ⇒r9 u

Kp(AS2) =

da1, a2 ⇒r1 ae, db1 ⇒r2 be, dc1, c2 ⇒r3 ce,
de1 ⇒r4 ee, df1 ⇒r5 fe, dg1 ⇒r6 ge,
dh1 ⇒r7 he, dw1 ⇒r8 we, da2 ⇒r9 ue,
db ∈ ae, df ∈ de, dg ∈ de,
dh ∈ ge, dh ∈ ie, du ∈ e1e,
dy ∈ ze, dx ∈ w1e, da2 ∈ e1e,
dx ∈ a1e

Kp(AS3) = {dc ∈ db1 ⇒r2 bee, dy ∈ da1, a2 ⇒r1 aee}
From these argumentation systems, α can construct the following arguments:
A1 : w1 A2 : z A3 : a1
A4 : a2 A5 : b1 A6 : c1
A7 : c2 A8 : e1 A9 : f1
A10 : g1 A11 : h1 A12 : i
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A13 : A1 ⇒r8 w A14 : A3,A4 ⇒r1 a A15 : A5 ⇒r2 b
A16 : A6,A7 ⇒r3 c A17 : A8 ⇒r4 e A18 : A9 ⇒r5 f
A19 : A10 ⇒r6 g A20 : A11 ⇒r7 h A21 : A4 ⇒r9 u
A′1 : da1, a2 ⇒r1 ae A′2 : db1 ⇒r2 be A′3 : dc1, c2 ⇒r3 ce
A′4 : de1 ⇒r4 ee A′5 : df1 ⇒r5 fe A′6 : dg1 ⇒r6 ge
A′7 : dh1 ⇒r7 he A′8 : dw1 ⇒r8 we A′9 : da2 ⇒r9 ue
A′10 : db ∈ ae A′11 : df ∈ de A′12 : dg ∈ de
A′13 : dh ∈ ge A′14 : dh ∈ ie A′15 : dy ∈ ze
A′16 : dx ∈ w1e A′17 : da2 ∈ e1e A′18 : dx ∈ a1e
A′′1 : dc ∈ db1 ⇒r2 bee A′′2 : dy ∈ da1, a2 ⇒r1 aee
For clarity, we will consider only object-level arguments when examining argument
acceptability and belief. Only one meta-argument,A′2 is not acceptable, due to a successful
attack by A16.
The grounded extension from the abstract framework derivable from PAT α is:
EG(PAT α) =

A1 : w1, A2 : z, A3 : a1,
A4 : a2, A5 : b1, A6 : c1,
A7 : c2, A9 : f1, A10 : g1,
A11 : h1, A13 : A1 ⇒r7 w, A14 : A3,A4 ⇒r1 a
A16 : A6,A7 ⇒r3 c, A18 : A9 ⇒r5 f, A20 : A11 ⇒r7 h,
A21 : A4 ⇒r9 u

Assume that Pα = {A9}; ClP (Pα) = {A9,A18}. Thus α’s communicable beliefs are,
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Figure 4.1: Framework from PAT α
Bcα =

w1, w, z,
a1, a2, a,
b1, c1, c2,
c, g1, h1,
h, u

Despite having acceptable arguments for both f1 and f , the argument for f1 is private
and thus renders both it, and the argument for f incommunicable.
The abstract framework derivable from PAT α is shown in Figure 4.1, with islands
(arguments that neither attack nor are attacked) removed for clarity. Arguments marked
with a tick (X) are acceptable.
The purpose of this example will be to demonstrate an argument revision process being
performed by α. Therefore only minimal knowledge bases and sets of rules are provided
for β, sufficient to allow the dialogue to proceed non-trivially, but without obscuring the
illustration of the concepts in subsequent chapters.
The construction of PAT β = 〈{AS1,AS2,AS3}, {K1,K2,K3}〉 is as follows:
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Figure 4.2: Framework from PAT β
Kp(AS1) = {a1, a2, b1, d1, d2}
Rd(AS1) = {(a1, a2 ⇒r1 a), (b1 ⇒r2 b), (d1, d2 ⇒r10 d)}
Kp(AS2) = {db ∈ ae}
Kp(AS3) = ∅
Kp(AS4) = {dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒r2 beee}
For clarity in notation, arguments that can be constructed from PAT β that are also
in present in PAT α are omitted below, and arguments that are not present in PAT α
(acceptable or otherwise) will be numbered starting from where α left off, at each level.
A22 : d1 A23 : d2
A24 : A14,A15 ⇒r10 d
A′19 : db ∈ ae A′′3 : dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒r2 beee
The grounded extension of the framework from PAT β , and β’s beliefs are as follows
(again, with only object-level arguments considered for clarity):
68
EG(PAT β) =

A3 : a1, A4 : a2, A5 : b1,
A14 : A5 ⇒r2 b, A22 : d1, A23 : d2,
A24 : A14,A15 ⇒r10 d

Bcβ = {a1, a2, b1, b, d1, d2, d}
The abstract framework derivable from PAT β is shown in Figure 4.2, with islands
removed for clarity.
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Figure 4.3: Combined framework from PAT α and PAT β
The combined framework from PAT α and PAT β can be seen in Figure 4.3. The
acceptability of arguments is not labelled, because acceptability is participant-specific,
however arguments have been labelled to show its source (PATα, PAT β or both). Neither
participant will have knowledge of this combined framework, merely their own part of it
and, following the dialogue, the parts communicated by their opponent. However, it is
provided here to show that, if the dialogue were exhaustive (w.r.t. each agent’s beliefs), α
could win a dialogue with a topic of τ = a, if A18 were not private. However, since it is
private, β would win the dialogue.
Consider the dialogue fragment in Table 4.1. For clarity and brevity, only new commit-
ments are explicitly represented at each move.
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id pl loc t Cpl
1 α claim({a}) − {a}
2 β why({a}) 1 ∅
3 α claim({a1, a2, da1, a2 ⇒ ae}) 2 C1α ∪ {a1, a2, da1, a2 ⇒ ae}
4 β claim({b, db ∈ a1e}) 3 {b, db ∈ a1e}
5 α why({b}) 4 C3α
6 β claim({b1, db1 ⇒ be}) 5 C4β ∪ {b1, db1 ⇒ be}
7 α claim({c, dc ∈ db1 ⇒ bee}) 6 C5α ∪ {c, dc ∈ db1 ⇒ bee}
8 β claim({d, dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒ beee}) 7 C6β ∪ {d, dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒ beee}
9 α why({d}) 8 C7α
10 β claim({d1, dd1 ⇒ de}) 9 C8β ∪ {d1, dd1 ⇒ de}
Table 4.1: Dialogue fragment
At this point, α’s original claim of a is not defended, because while α defeated β’s
counter-claim of b (with c), the undercut from c on b1 ⇒ b was itself defeated by β’s claim
(and justification) of d. α does possess an acceptable defeater of d (f , on d1), however f1
is marked as a private belief, and thus both it and f are incommunicable by α. This leaves
α with no option but to concede, then retract their original claim of a. This in turn will
require a retraction of at least one element of the support for a (a1, a2 and/or da1, a2 ⇒ ae),
along with (if α so wishes) a justification of the retraction.
However, for now, the example shall be left in its current state (i.e. without α conceding
or retracting anything). It will be continued in Chapter 6, where it will be demonstrated
that argument revision is an effective tool in either determining what to retract, or deciding
whether or not it is better to be dishonest in order to defend the original claim.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, a simple dialogue framework, SPD, was specified. The framework is
based on the ASPIC+ framework for argumentation, and its associated meta- extensions
defined in Chapter 3.
Before specifying the framework, each participant’s beliefs were established. Each
participant in an SPD dialogue possesses a personal argumentation theory, whose abstract
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framework is evaluated under grounded semantics; the conclusions of all arguments in the
grounded extension (closed under strict rule application) are what constitute beliefs.
The notion of private arguments was also introduced. Private arguments are acceptable
arguments that, using some presently unspecified criteria, the participant does not want
to reveal. Using this set of private arguments, and the beliefs determined as above, we
established a set of communicable beliefs for each participant — those beliefs they are
prepared to share in a dialogue.
In terms of the dialogue framework itself, SPD differs from previous ASPIC+ dialogue
frameworks [Weide and Dignum, 2011] in that its locutions are defined over formulae
of the logical language L, as opposed to arguments. This allows for a repeated claim-
challenge-concede process instead of relying on entire arguments being communicated
at once. This influences the construction of a shared argumentation theory, which keeps
a deductively monotonic record of the dialogue, and is used to determine what previous
claims are no longer acceptable.
Finally, a running example was presented. This example demonstrated the dialogue
protocol up until a point where one of the participants would appear to have to concede
then retract. However, the example has been left at this point and will be picked up again
in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 5
Argument Revision
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, Argument Revision is formally defined and specified in terms of a system
of structured argumentation. While in classic models of belief revision, the process of
modifying a belief set is guided by a qualitative, arbitrary entrenchment ordering over the
beliefs, the model presented here instead examines quantifiable effects of a revision on the
system in arriving at a measured and justifiable determination of minimal change.
Before considering the process of Argument Revision, consideration must first be given
to what the goals of the process are. In belief revision, the aim is to update a knowledge
base, either by adding new beliefs (both with and without consideration for consistency),
or by removing existing ones. While it might seem obvious to directly translate these
concepts to Argument Revision (i.e. to add new arguments or remove existing ones), to
do so would overlook an important principle in the system of argumentation being used —
that of argument acceptability.
Recall from Chapter 4 that a participant in a dialogue based on SPD uses the conclu-
sions of arguments in the grounded extension of (the abstract framework derived from)
its personal argumentation theory as a basis for its beliefs. If a certain argument were
to disappear from the grounded extension, the participant would no longer believe its
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conclusion (assuming no other acceptable arguments for that same conclusion appear in
the grounded extension). Alternatively, if a new argument were added to the theory, and
that argument were acceptable, the participant would believe its conclusion.
An argument can disappear from an extension in one of two ways — either it is
defeated by another (acceptable) argument, or it is removed from the argumentation theory
completely. Similarly, an argument can be added to an extension either through adding it
to the theory, and there being no acceptable defeaters of it, or through removing or making
unacceptable all acceptable defeaters.
Argument Revision is, therefore, more flexible than belief revision, because instead of
modifying a flat belief set, we are instead modifying the underlying model (i.e. system
of argumentation) from which belief is derived. Since the derivation of belief depends
on both the existence and acceptability of arguments, Argument Revision provides two
possible ways in which to add and remove beliefs (structure and acceptability) whereas
flat belief sets provide only one (structure alone).
The goal of an Argument Revision process is one of:
1. ensuring that a certain argument is removed from, or made unacceptable in, an
argumentation theory; or
2. ensuring that a certain argument is added to, and/or made acceptable in, an argumen-
tation theory.
To reach either of these goals, the process of Argument Revision involves modify-
ing an argumentation theory and its constituent argumentation systems. Arguments are
constructed through applying rules to a knowledge base, which means the removal of argu-
ments from an argumentation theory is achieved through modifying either the knowledge
base or set of rules. Acceptability of arguments is computed based on defeat relations
between them, which in turn is arrived at based on 1) contrariness between formula; 2)
the preference ordering over arguments (which in itself is partly derived from preferences
over the knowledge base and defeasible rules); and 3) strictness and firmness properties of
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arguments, based on which type of rule(s) (i.e. strict or defeasible) and types of premise
(i.e. axiom, ordinary or assumption) the arguments use.
It is not, however, necessary to specify different ways of performing each type of
modification detailed above. Recall that in meta-argumentation (Chapter 3), every object-
level component (i.e. rule, contrary and preference) there exists a corresponding meta-level
argument which concludes the meta-level representation of that component. As with
object-level arguments, meta-level arguments are also open to revision and so, for instance,
a rebutting attack on argument B by argument A can be removed by removing the meta-
argument A′ with Conc(A′) = dConc(A) ∈ Conc(B)e. Alternatively, A′ could be
made unacceptable by introducing an argument that defeats it or by modifying meta-meta-
arguments to introduce an attack, modify preferences etc.
The key observation here is that all forms of Argument Revision can be performed by
either adding or removing (meta-) arguments, which involves modifying a knowledge base
and/or rule sets. Since rules are themselves represented by meta-arguments, we can specify
only a single method of Argument Revision: knowledge base modification.
In this chapter, we provide a formal account of Argument Revision in terms of the
ASPIC+ framework, incorporating definitions of Argument Revision and expansion, func-
tions for modifying an argumentation system’s knowledge base and a determination of
minimal change based on quantifiable, measurable effects of a revision. Properties of three
special types of revision (rule-, contrary- and preference-based) are also explored.
This chapter proceeds as follows: in section 5.2 the principles of argument contraction
and expansion are defined and explained; in section 5.3 the process of Argument Revision
is explained; in section 5.4, rule, preference and contrariness-based Argument Revision is
explained; in section 5.5 the properties of Argument Revision are explored and in section
5.6 measures of minimal change and their use in determining a minimal change are defined.
74
5.2 Argument contraction and expansion
Argument Revision is sub-divided into two broad processes — argument contraction and
argument expansion. In both processes, the goal relates to the acceptability of arguments
and not necessarily (in the case of contraction at least) their presence in the resultant
argumentation theory.
The goal of argument contraction is to ensure certain arguments are no longer accept-
able, while expansion ensures that they are. As is the case with belief revision, we assume
it is not possible to uniquely specify Argument Revision functions, because there may be
multiple possible methods of achieving the goal [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988]. This will be further
explained in the definitions of the operators.
In subsequent sections and chapters, the notation A ∈ E(AT ) means there is an
acceptable argument in the abstract framework derived from the meta-argumentation
theory AT , under some unspecified, unique-extension semantics1, subsumed by complete
semantics.
5.2.1 Principles of Argument Revision
Before formally defining operators for Argument Revision, it is first necessary to specify
the exact nature of Argument Revision, in terms of what a revision process aims to achieve.
In the classic AGM theory of belief revision, there are three broad processes — contrac-
tion, where a belief is removed from a belief set, expansion, where new beliefs are added to
a belief set with no consideration for consistency, and revision where new beliefs are added
and (if necessary) existing beliefs are modified to bring about consistency [Alchourro´n
et al., 1985].
In order to translate these concepts into those suitable for Argument Revision, defined
in terms of the ASPIC+ framework, we must consider certain features of the framework,
and its intended use. Firstly, as noted in section 5.1, when using systems of argumentation
1The restriction to unique-extension semantics is imposed because translations between multi-extension
semantics and belief are unclear, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore them.
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built on Dung’s [1995] abstract theory (as the ASPIC+ framework [Prakken, 2010] does),
the acceptability of arguments provides a convenient method of establishing beliefs. Thus,
in order to revise beliefs, it is possible to modify only the acceptability of arguments,
without necessarily modifying the arguments themselves. Note that this does not preclude
the modification of arguments, but it does provide an additional method of revision, which
may result in fewer changes (see section 5.6 for further exploration of minimal change).
Secondly, consistency in the ASPIC+ framework is different from that found in the
belief sets used in the AGM theory. Prakken [2010] proves that the rationality postulates
of Caminada [2007a] hold for his version of the ASPIC+ framework, provided certain
conditions are met. These rationality postulates include two relating to consistency:
• Direct consistency — the set of conclusions of all arguments in an extension is
consistent
• Indirect consistency — the closure of the set of conclusions of all arguments in an
extension under strict-rule application is consistent
The conditions required for these postulates to hold are that (i) the preference ordering
over arguments is reasonable (Chapter 3, p.41, Definition 3.2.5); and (ii) that the argumen-
tation theory is well-formed (Chapter 3, p.40). In the present work, we shall always use
either the last-link or weakest-link principles for establishing a preference ordering, both
of which Prakken [2010] proves to be reasonable, and thus that condition will always be
satisfied.
Well-formedness, however, depends entirely on the composition of the argumentation
theory and does not have a pre-defined algorithm that guarantees it for all theories. During
an Argument Revision process, it is entirely possible that a theory is yielded which is not
well-formed — consider in the simplest case adding to the knowledge base a formula that
is a contrary of the consequent of a strict rule.
Thus, a second overall principle in Argument Revision is that the resultant argumen-
tation theory be well-formed. This ensures that the set of conclusions in an extension
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remains consistent, and thus the agent’s beliefs do likewise.
5.2.2 Argument contraction
Argument contraction is the process of modifying an argumentation theory to yield a new,
well-formed argumentation theory such that certain arguments that are acceptable in the
original theory are not acceptable in the new theory. As previously noted, multiple methods
of performing a contraction may exist; while each of these methods will have yielded an
argumentation theory that satisfies the goal (i.e. the specified arguments are not acceptable
in it), each of these theories will be different, due to having had different changes made to
it.
Given an argumentation theory AT and a set of arguments S, AT −˙S is a maximal
(w.r.t. set inclusion) set of argumentation theories where ∀AT − ∈ AT −˙S:
• AT − is well-formed
• ∀A ∈ S, A /∈ E(AT −)
We refer to AT − as a contraction of AT by S.
Different methods will be used to reach each argumentation theory in AT −˙S; these
possible methods will be described in further detail in section 5.3.
5.2.3 Argument expansion
Argument expansion is the process of modifying an argumentation theory into a new,
well-formed argumentation theory, such that a given set of arguments are both present, and
acceptable in the new theory. Again, it is not possible to uniquely specify an expansion
function due to the possible different methods of achieving it, so as with argument contrac-
tion, the output is not a distinct argumentation theory, but a set of all theories that satisfy
the properties.
Given an argumentation theory AT and a set of arguments S, AT +˙S is a maximal
(w.r.t. set inclusion) set of argumentation theories where ∀AT + ∈ AT +˙S:
77
• AT + is well-formed
• ∀A ∈ S, A ∈ E(AT +)
We refer to AT + as an expansion of AT by S.
5.3 Process of Argument Revision
The revision of an argumentation theory, whether it be through contraction or expansion,
is carried out by modifying one or more of the argumentation systems in the theory, which
in turn results in arguments being added, removed, or changing acceptability. For example,
a contraction may be carried out by adding a new argument that makes one or more of the
arguments provided to the contraction operator unacceptable; similarly, an expansion may
be carried out by removing an argument that defeats one of the arguments provided to the
expansion operator.
The process of revising an argumentation theory is recursive. For each input argu-
ment to an expansion or contraction, the goal is achieved through modifying arguments
that interact with it, whether they be sub-arguments, attacking arguments or meta-level
arguments for rules, preference and contrariness.
The complete removal and addition of arguments can be achieved through modifying
the knowledge base and/or rules in an argumentation system, while acceptability can
also be altered, by modifying the preference and contrariness relations. The use of meta-
argumentation allows each of these modifications to be specified by a single process, where
the knowledge base in an argumentation system is modified.
Recall that for every rule and preference or contrariness in an argumentation system,
there is a corresponding (possibly atomic) meta-argument for it in a higher-level system.
Thus, instead of modifying rules, preferences and contrariness directly, we can instead
perform an Argument Revision process with respect to their corresponding meta-level
arguments. And, since meta-argumentation systems are argumentation systems, a single
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method of knowledge base modification can be specified, and applied to any knowledge
base, in any argumentation system in an argumentation theory.
Even small modifications to the knowledge based in an argumentation system can
have a big impact on the arguments in the argumentation theory. For every argument, its
premises are a subset of the knowledge base, so removing only one of those premises
will result in the entire argument (and a subset of its sub-arguments) being lost. Similarly,
adding only one formula to the knowledge base can allow multiple new arguments to be
constructed, if all other required premises are already present.
Where the intention is to change the acceptability of arguments, the process is less
straightforward than simply adding or removing arguments, because changing acceptability
can be achieved in several different ways:
• Adding a new argument (through adding one or more formulae to the knowledge
base) which acts as a (possibly indirect) defeater or defender of the original argument
• Removing an argument (through removing one or more formulae from the knowl-
edge base) which acts as a (possibly indirect2) defender or defeater of the original
argument.
• Revising the meta-arguments for contrariness and preference relations, which involve
the original argument.
The knowledge base in an argumentation system can be modified by both adding and
removing formulae. The result of an addition is a new argumentation system, whose
argumentation theory is possibly not well-formed. Before formally defining the concepts
of formula addition and removal, a definition of equality between argumentation systems
is first provided. This definition allows certain properties of expansion and removal to be
expressed. For clarity, the contrariness function, −, is represented by cf .
2Dung [1995] defines indirect defence as: A indirectly defends B iff there exists an even-length path
(with non-zero length) from A to B in the argument graph
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Definition 5.3.1 (Argumentation system equality)
Two argumentation systems AS1 and AS2 are equal iff:
• L(AS1) = L(AS2)
• cf(AS1) = cf(AS2)
• R(AS1) = R(AS2)
• K(AS1) = K(AS2)
• the partial pre-orders on K(AS1) andR(AS1) are, respectively, identical to those
on K(AS2) andR(AS2)
In other words, two (object-level) argumentation systems are equal iff all their compo-
nents (language, contrariness, rules, preferences and knowledge base) are, respectively,
identical.
5.3.1 Formula removal
When a formula is removed from a knowledge base, the result is a new argumentation
system that is identical to the original argumentation system, except for the knowledge
base which lacks the removed formula.
Formally, this is captured by the formula removal function, which takes as input an
argumentation system and some formula, and provides as output the new argumentation
system whose knowledge base does not contain that formula:
Definition 5.3.2 Formula removal function
AS − φ: K(AS − φ) = K(AS)\{φ}
To show that an argumentation theory has had a formula removed from the knowledge
base of one of its argumentation systems, the notationAT −(φ,ASn) is used. For instance,
if the formula φ is removed from the knowledge base of AS1, then:
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AT − (φ,AS1) = 〈{AS1 − φ, . . . ,ASn}, {K1\{φ}, . . . ,Kn},〉
Certain properties of the formula removal function can be demonstrated. Firstly, if the
input formula is not present in the knowledge base of AS (that is, φ /∈ K(AS)), the output
argumentation system is identical to the output:
Proposition 5.3.1 If φ /∈ K(AS), AS − φ = AS
Proof: if φ /∈ K(AS) then K(AS)\{φ} = K(AS). Thus K(AS − φ) = K(AS) and
hence AS − φ = AS. 
It is possible to remove multiple formulae at once. This is the same as performing a
sequence of removals, where the input argumentation system for the nth removal is the
output from the (n− 1)th removal.
Proposition 5.3.2 AS − (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn) = AS − φ1 − . . .− φn
Proof: Consider first the knowledge base ofAS−(φ1∧. . .∧φn): K(AS−φ1∧. . .∧φn) =
K(AS)\{φ1, . . . , φn} = K(AS)\{φ1}\ . . . \{φn},
Consider now the knowledge base of AS − φ1 − . . . − φn: K(AS − φ1 − . . . − φn) =
K(AS − φ1 − . . . − φn−1)\{φn} = K(AS − φ1 − . . . − φn−2)\{φn−1}\{φn} = . . . =
K(AS)\{φ1}\ . . . \{φn} = K(AS − φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn) 
Formula removal also always preserves well-formedness.
Proposition 5.3.3 If AT is well-formed, then AT − (φ,AS) is also well-formed.
Proof: SinceR(AS) = R(AS − φ), we consider only the knowledge base in AS − φ. If
AT is well-formed, then K(AS) satisfies [Prakken, 2010, Definition 6.8]. Since K(AS −
φ) ⊆ K(AS), K(AS − φ) also satisfies the definition. 
5.3.2 Formula addition
The formula addition function governs the addition of a formula to the knowledge base of
an argumentation system.
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One issue of adding information to the knowledge base is knowing which subset it
should be placed in. The nature of the formula addition function is that it adds formulae
simply to introduce new arguments, with no justification (where justification could, for
instance, come from another agent). We therefore classify added formulae as assumptions.
Definition 5.3.3 Formula addition function
AS + φ: Ka(AS + φ) = Ka(AS) ∪ {φ}
Remark 9 Note also that because Ka(AS) ⊆ K(AS), K(AS + φ) = K(AS) ∪ {φ}
Similar to the formula removal function, to show that an argumentation theory has had
a formula added to the knowledge base of one of its argumentation systems, the notation
AT + (φ,ASn) is used. For instance, if the formula φ is added to the knowledge base of
AS1, then:
AT + (φ,AS1) = 〈{AS1 + φ, . . . ,ASn}, {K1 ∪ {φ}, . . . ,Kn},〉
The formula addition function possesses several properties that assist in an Argument
Revision process. Firstly, the function is deductively monotonic (that is, no arguments,
acceptable or otherwise, are lost when expanding an argumentation system).
Proposition 5.3.4 The formula addition function, +, is deductively monotonic.
Proof: ∀A ∈ Args(AS), Prem(A) ⊆ K(AS). For some φ ∈ L, K(AS) ⊆ K(AS +φ).
Thus, ∀A ∈ Args(AS), Prem(A) ⊆ K(AS + φ). 
Furthermore, there is no change to an argumentation system if the input formula to an
expansion is already an assumption in the knowledge base, or if the input formula to a
removal is not in the knowledge base:
Proposition 5.3.5 If for AS + φ, φ ∈ Ka(AS), AS + φ = AS.
Proof: Ka(AS + φ) = Ka(AS)∪ {φ}. Since φ ∈ Ka(AS), Ka(AS + φ) = Ka(AS). 
Proposition 5.3.6 If for AS − φ, φ /∈ K(AS), AS − φ = AS.
Proof: K(AS − φ) = K(AS)\{φ}. Since φ /∈ K(AS), K(AS − φ) = K(AS). 
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Both the formula removal and formula addition functions yield new argumentation
systems and, hence, a new argumentation theory. However, it’s possible that further
modifications are required to these new systems — for instance, if adding a formula brings
about a new argumentation theory that is not well-formed. As with the initial removal or
expansion, there may be multiple possible modifications, which again raises the question
of which to choose.
In order to model the possible choices when performing an Argument Revision process,
we use a structure called a change graph.
5.3.3 Change graphs
When revising an argumentation theory, through expansion or contraction, there may
be multiple possible ways in which the goal can be achieved (that is, arriving at an
argumentation theory that satisfies the properties of whichever revision process is being
used). Furthermore, some methods have more than one stage — for instance, if adding a
formula brings about an argumentation theory that is not well-formed — with each stage
also presenting a choice as to the next possible stage.
This raises first the question of how to identify all possible methods of expanding or
contracting an argumentation theory; then, there is the question of exactly which method
should be chosen. In this section, the issue of identifying the possible methods will be
addressed; choosing between them is then addressed in section 5.6.
Recall that the revision of an argumentation theory is performed through modifying
the knowledge bases in the argumentation systems within the theory, with modifications
continuing to take place until the properties of the chosen revision (i.e. expansion or
contraction) are satisfied. One such sequence of modifications can be seen as a route, or
path, from the original argumentation theory to an argumentation theory that has been
expanded or contracted with respect to the input arguments.
Thus, to model the possible ways in which an argumentation theory can be either
expanded or contracted (again, with respect to a set of input arguments) by modifying
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the knowledge bases of its argumentation systems, we define a structure called a change
graph. A change graph can be used for either expansion or contraction and its definition
is not dependant on either. For convenience, we use the notation Π′ to represent a set of
argumentation theories {AT ±1 , . . . ,AT ±n } that are revisions ofAT , but do not necessarily
satisfy the criteria for expansion or contraction.
Definition 5.3.4 A change graph CG(AT ,Π′) for the revisions of AT to a set of argu-
mentation theories Π′ = {AT ±1 , . . . ,AT ±n } is a directed acyclic graph 〈Υ,Ω〉 where:
• Υ ⊆ Π (where Π is the set of all possible argumentation theories)
• Π′ ⊆ Υ is minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) in that ∀AT ′ ∈ Π′, ¬∃AT ′′ ∈ Π′,
K(AT )∆K(AT ′′) ⊂ K(AT )∆K(AT ′)
• (Atomic change) Ω ⊆ Υ×Υ where ∀ω ∈ Ω such that ω = (AT ′,AT ′′), we have
that | K(AT ′)∆K(AT ′′) |= ±1
The minimality constraint on Π′ in Definition 5.3.4 is a pruning exercise that discounts
any argumentation theories arrived at by making unnecessary additions and/or removals,
by considering the set of net changes between AT and some AT ′ ∈ Π′: there can exist no
argumentation theory AT ′′ ∈ Π′ where the set of net changes in AT ′′ is a proper subset of
the set of net changes in AT ′. The atomic change condition of Definition 5.3.4 mandates
that on each edge of a change graph, only one removal or one addition in one knowledge
base is performed.
If anyAT ′ ∈ Π′ satisfies the properties ofAT −˙S (it is well-formed and no arguments
in S are acceptable in AFAT ′), then AT ′ is a contraction of AT by S and hence AT ′ ∈
AT −˙S. Similarly, if any AT ′ ∈ Π′ satisfies the properties of AT +˙S (it is well-formed
and all arguments in S are acceptable in AFAT ′) then AT ′ is an expansion of AT by S
and hence AT ′ ∈ AT +˙S.
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5.4 Rule, preference and contrariness-based Argument
Revision
This chapter has thus far focused on modifying the knowledge base in an argumentation
system in order to revise an argumentation theory. It is also possible to achieve the goal of
a revision process by modifying the rules, preferences and contrariness in an argumentation
system (possibly in conjunction with knowledge base modifications). It is in making these
modifications that meta-argumentation is used.
Recall the definition of a meta-argumentation system (Chapter 3, p.44, Definition 3.3.1),
in which every component of an object-level system is the conclusion of an argument
in the associated meta-level system. This argument may be atomic (i.e. the meta-level
representation of the component is an element of the knowledge base in the meta-system),
however it could equally be a conclusion derivable from a set of antecedents and an
inference rule. In either case, it is still possible to model the addition or removal of the
component using the same change graph, because each edge represents the modification of
a knowledge base in any of the argumentation systems within an argumentation theory.
Revising arguments for contrariness and preferences involves the same process as re-
vising object-level arguments — modifying the knowledge base in the meta-argumentation
system with respect to the argument(s) for the contrariness or preference. Rule-based
revision, however, is more complex, because there are several ways in which changes to
rules can bring about changes to the arguments and their acceptability in an argumentation
theory.
5.4.1 Rule-based Argument Revision
Revising the rules in an argumentation system can be used to either introduce new argu-
ments, or modify existing ones such that they are removed altogether, or have their strength
modified in order to change the success or otherwise of an attack.
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Rule addition and removal
Using rules to introduce new or removing existing arguments is similar to the overall
Argument Revision process, in that in order to add or remove rules at the object-level,
we modify the arguments for them at the meta-level. Modifying these arguments is an
Argument Revision process in itself, carried out in the same way is any other.
Rule reclassification
The second method of rule-based revision does not involve adding or removing rules, but
instead reclassifying them. The set of rules in an argumentation system is divided into
those that are strict (i.e. hold without exception) and those that are defeasible (i.e. generally
hold, but may not under some exceptional circumstances).
To reclassify a rule is to change a strict rule to defeasible, or a defeasible rule to strict.
Reclassification of rules does not impact on the construction of arguments, but it does
impact on their properties — consider, in the simplest case, reclassifying a rule used by
a strict argument. Since that rule would become defeasible, the argument too would be
defeasible and, hence, weaker.
As a more concrete example, consider the following knowledge base and rule sets in
an argumentation system AS i:
• Kp = {p, q}
• Rs = {(p→ s)}
• Rd = {(q ⇒ ¬s)}
The following arguments can be constructed:
• A1 : q
• A2 : p
• A3 : A2 → s
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• A4 : A1 ⇒ ¬s
IfRs were then closed under transposition (Chapter 3, p.41, Definition 3.2.7),Cltrs(Rs) =
{p → s,¬s → ¬p}. This allows A4 to be extended with A+ : A4 → ¬p, which in turn
defeatsA2 and hence alsoA3. The resultant abstract framework, evaluated under grounded
semantics, can be seen in Figure 5.1. Arguments with a solid border are “in” and arguments
with a dashed border are “undecided”.
A1
A2A3
A4
A+
Figure 5.1: Framework using strict rule p→ s withRs closed under transposition
If, however, we were to modify AS i, into AS ′i such that:
• K′p = Kp
• R′s = ∅ (removal of p→ s)
• R′d = {(p⇒ s), (q ⇒ ¬s)} (addition of p⇒ s)
the defeat relations change. The resultant abstract framework, again evaluated under
grounded semantics with the same labelling convention, can be seen in Figure 5.2. There
are two changes to the framework; firstly, instead of a strict argumentA3 for s, there is now
87
a defeasible argument A′3; while this still defeats A4, it is now reciprocated. Furthermore,
and of more significance, A+ is no longer an argument and thus A2 is not defeated and so
is now labelled “in”.
A1 A2 A3`
A4
Figure 5.2: Framework using defeasible rule p⇒ s
The same example can be used to illustrate the opposite process — a defeasible rule
changing to strict. If our initial argumentation system contained the rule p⇒ s, we would
start with the framework in Figure 5.2; if, in a new system, this rule were then substituted
for p→ s, we would obtain the framework in Figure 5.1.
Rule reclassification is characterised through the use of meta-argumentation. Recall the
characterisation of strict and defeasible rules introduced in definition 3.3.2. A rule is strict
iff its meta-level representation has no contraries; otherwise, it is defeasible. Thus, a strict
rule at the object-level can be re-classified into a defeasible rule if we were to introduce
a contrary to it at the meta-level; similarly, a defeasible rule at the object-level can be
re-classified into a strict rule if we were to remove all contraries to it at the meta-level.
In the above example of strict-to-defeasible reclassification, we could introduce a
contrary φ ∈ dp⇒ se in the argumentation system AS i+1. Note that is it not necessary
for an argument for φ to be present in the meta-level system (acceptable or otherwise);
what is important is the presence of the contrariness relation. The opposite process (i.e.
defeasible to strict reclassification) would take place through the removal of the existing
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contrary or contraries that caused the rule to be currently classified as defeasible.
Reclassifying rules is similar to premise-based Argument Revision, in that one small
change can have a significant impact on the argumentation theory and the resultant abstract
framework, as the simple example presented above shows. In the case of strict-to-defeasible
reclassification, the example has shown the complete removal of one argument and another
made acceptable; conversely, defeasible-to strict-reclassification results in one argument
being added and another changing from acceptable to undecided.
Introducing a contrary in an argumentation system requires a corresponding meta-level
argument for it. Therefore in order to introduce a meta-level contrariness relation with
respect to an object-level rule, we must introduce an argument for it at the next meta-level
— that is, an argumentation system at level i+ 2, given that the object level is level i and
its meta-level is level i+ 1.
The process of introducing an argument at any level is identical — perform an argument
expansion process with respect to the argument that is to be introduced, which in the case
of arguments that are currently not present will require the addition of knowledge base
formulae, rules or both.
5.4.2 Contrariness and preference-based Argument Revision
Contrariness and preferences are used in order to determine defeat between arguments, with
the former being used to determine the initial attack and the latter determining whether or
not it is successful (i.e. results in defeat). Using contrariness and preferences in Argument
Revision is thus a method of changing the acceptability of arguments, similar to rule
reclassification. However, the actual process of modifying contrariness and preferences is
more analogous to rule addition and removal, in that it is carried out through modifying
the meta-level arguments for the appropriate components.
To illustrate the effect of contrariness-based Argument Revision, consider the argu-
mentation framework in Figure 5.3, where in the underlying argumentation theory (AT )
Conc(A1) ∈ Conc(A3), Conc(A2) ∈ Conc(A1) and A3 ∈ Sub(A2) (which, in turn,
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have corresponding meta-arguments).
A1
A2 A3
Figure 5.3: Argumentation framework with all arguments “undecided”
If AT were contracted with respect to the meta-argument for contrariness between
A1 and A3 (i.e. AT −˙{A′1}, where A′1 : dConc(A1) ∈ Conc(A3)e), the argumentation
framework would change, as shown in Figure 5.4.
A1
A3A2
Figure 5.4: Argumentation framework with A2 and A3 “in” and A1 “out”
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5.5 Properties of Argument Revision
In sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, several properties of the formula removal and addition operators
were described. In this section, the properties of combining these operators will be
examined, along with an exploration of the operators in terms of the properties of change
in abstract argumentation specified by Cayrol et al. [2010].
5.5.1 Combining removal and addition
When a removal and an addition are combined, the order in which the operators are
applied is important, especially if the first operator does not cause any changes to the
argumentation system. For instance, a removal can only be “undone” (through addition) if
the input formula was an assumption in the original knowledge base. This shows the same
behaviour as the recovery postulate in AGM [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988].
Proposition 5.5.1 (AS − φ) + φ = AS iff φ ∈ Ka(AS)
Proof: From basic set theory:
• If φ /∈ Ka(AS), AS − φ = AS. However, φ ∈ Ka((AS − φ) + φ), hence
(AS − φ) + φ 6= AS.
• If φ ∈ Ka(AS), K(AS − φ) = Ka(AS)\{φ}. Ka((AS − φ) + φ) = Ka(AS −
φ) ∪ {φ} = (Ka(AS)\{φ}) ∪ {φ} = Ka(AS)

Similarly, an expansion can only be “undone” (through removal) only if the input
formula was not already in the original knowledge base.
Proposition 5.5.2 AS + φ− φ = AS iff φ /∈ K(AS)
Proof: From basic set theory:
• If φ ∈ Ka(AS), AS + φ = AS. However, AS − φ 6= AS.
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• If φ /∈ K(AS),K(AS+φ) = K(AS)∪{φ}. K((AS+φ)−φ) = K(AS+φ)\{φ} =
(K(AS) ∪ {φ})\{φ} = K(AS)

5.5.2 Structural properties
The properties of change in abstract argumentation described by Cayrol et al. [2010] can
equally be applied to ASPIC+ structured argumentation, because it instantiates Dung’s
abstract approach. The structural properties provided in Cayrol et al.’s work describe the
effects on the set of extensions when adding and removing arguments and interactions
(attacks). These are summarised in Table 5.1.
Property for a change operation Characterisation of the property
the change is decisive E = ∅ or E = {{}} or | E |> 2
and | E ′ |= 1 and E ′ 6= {{}}
the change is restrictive | E |>| E ′ |> 2
the change is questioning | E |<| E ′ |
the change is destructive E 6= ∅ and E 6= {{}}
E ′ = ∅ or E ′ = {{}}
the change is expansive | E |=| E
′ | and
∀εji ∈ E ′, ∃εi ∈ E, εi ⊂ εji
the change is conservative E = E ′
the change is altering | E |=| E
′ | and
∃εi ∈ E s.t. ∀εij ∈ E ′, εi 6⊆ εij
Table 5.1: Structural properties for a change operation, from [Cayrol et al., 2010]
An Argument Revision process will constitute exactly one of the above changes. There
are some limitations, however; expansion can never be destructive, while conservative can
only hold of expansion and contraction under certain specific circumstances.
Proposition 5.5.3 An expansion can never be destructive.
Proof: For someAT and set of arguments S = {A1, . . . ,An}, S ⊆ E(AT +˙S). However,
if AT +˙S were destructive, E(AT +˙S) = ∅ or E(AT +˙S) = {{}} 
Proposition 5.5.4 A contraction AT −˙S is conservative if ∀A ∈ S , A /∈ E(AT ).
Proof: If ∀A ∈ S , A /∈ E(AT ), AT −˙S = AT and hence E(AT ) = E(AT −˙S). 
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Proposition 5.5.5 An expansion AT +˙S is conservative if ∀A ∈ S , A ∈ E(AT ).
Proof: If ∀A ∈ S , A /∈ E(AT ), AT +˙S = AT and hence E(AT ) = E(AT +˙S). 
In section 5.6, these properties are further explored in terms of measures of minimal
change.
5.6 Measures of minimal change
One of the main principles in the AGM theory of belief revision is that of minimal change
— when beliefs are revised, the process is carried out with as small an impact as possible on
the beliefs that remain. This is not measured solely in terms of logical consequences, but
also through an entrenchment ordering placed on beliefs, where entrenchment is a measure
of how important a belief is; the higher the degree of entrenchment, the more important
the belief. Conversely, the lower the degree of entrenchment, the more likely the agent is
to give up that belief during a belief revision process.
A major drawback of entrenchment orderings is the criteria used to determine them.
Ga¨rdenfors [1988] assumes that only qualitative criteria are suitable, because they solve
the problem of uniquely specifying a revision (or expansion) function. However, this is a
rather substantial trade-off, because the price for allowing a unique revision (expansion)
function is to introduce some unspecified, and possibly arbitrary criteria for evaluating
beliefs. Furthermore, in a dynamic environment an agent will possibly, by definition,
receive new information of which it was not previously aware; the use of qualitative
methods makes it almost impossible for the agent to autonomously evaluate the importance
of this information and, thus, appropriately place it in an entrenchment ordering.
If we are to look beyond the concept of an entrenchment ordering as a way of determin-
ing minimal change when revising an ASPIC+ argumentation theory, the features of the
framework itself provide certain clues. An obvious feature to include is the structure of the
arguments themselves; an argumentation theory is revised through modifying the knowl-
edge bases in its argumentation systems in order to add or remove arguments. However,
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any element in a knowledge base may be a premise in more than one argument, resulting
in not only an input argument being eliminated from the system, and the theory, but also
other arguments that are completely unrelated. Consider the knowledge base and rules in
an argumentation system in the argumentation theory AT :
• Kp = {a}
• Rd = {a⇒ b, a⇒ c}
With arguments:
• A1: a
• A2: A1 ⇒ b
• A3: A1 ⇒ c
Assume that we have no further information (i.e. relating to contrariness, preferences
etc.) and wish to contract AT with respect to A2; that is, AT −˙{A2}. The only possible
method is to either remove a from the knowledge base, or a⇒ b from the rules (through
revising its meta-level argument). Removing a would result in not only A1 being removed
from the theory, but also A3 and therefore has a greater effect than removing a⇒ b.
A further consideration relates to the acceptability of arguments. If a previously
acceptable argument becomes unacceptable following a revision process, any arguments
of which it was the sole defeater would become acceptable; conversely, an unacceptable
argument that becomes acceptable would render unacceptable any arguments it is a defeater
of.
To expand the above example, consider the following extensions to the knowledge base
and rules, and new contrariness:
• Kp = {a, d}
• Rd = {a⇒ b, a⇒ c, d⇒ e}
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A1 A2
A5
A3
A4
Figure 5.5: Argumentation framework with A5 “out”
• b ∈ e, e ∈ c
This yields the arguments:
• A1: a
• A2: A1 ⇒ b
• A3: A1 ⇒ c
• A4: d
• A5: A4 ⇒ e
The abstract framework derived fromAT , evaluated under grounded semantics (where
a solid border means the argument is “in” and a dotted border means the argument is “out”),
is shown in Figure 5.5.
Again, if we were to contract AT with respect to A2, and assuming it were carried out
through removing the argument completely, the framework would change such that A5
becomes acceptable and A3 becomes unacceptable. This is shown in Figure 5.6.
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A1
A3
A4A5
Figure 5.6: Argumentation framework with A5 “in”
Thus, we have four measurable effects of a revision process on an argumentation
theory:
• Argument loss — when removing elements of an argumentation system’s knowledge
base, at the very least the atomic arguments constructed from those elements will be
lost to the system and the theory. If those arguments are then sub-arguments in other
arguments, those other arguments will also be lost.
• Acceptability loss — when making either type of modification to an argumentation
system’s knowledge base, arguments that defend other arguments may be lost, which
in turn makes those arguments unacceptable. Alternatively, a contrariness (attack) or
preference relation may be added or removed, resulting in new or removed defeat.
• Argument gain — when adding elements to an argumentation system’s knowledge
base, those new elements will, at the very least, result in new atomic arguments
being created in the system and the theory. When then considered with the rules in
the system, they may also become sub-arguments in other, larger arguments.
• Acceptability gain — when making either type of modification to an argumentation
system’s knowledge base, arguments that are the sole defeaters of other arguments
may be lost or made unacceptable, which in turn makes those defeated arguments
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acceptable. Alternatively, a contrary (attack) or preference relation may be added or
removed, resulting in defeaters being defeated, or the attack that results in a defeat
being lost.
To capture these four effects, each is defined in terms of a function related to formula
additions and removals. The definition of each function involves an argumentation system
AS in an argumentation theory AT , and a formula φ in the knowledge base in AS . ΥG is
used to represent the set of all argumentation theories in a change graph, and the type of
change (addition or removal) unspecified; however, in subsequent chapters and sections we
will, where necessary, make explicit the type of change with a superscript + (for addition)
or − (for removal). Where it is necessary to represent a change that is left unspecified, we
again use ±.
The first function, the argument drop function identifies those acceptable arguments
that are completely lost when removing or adding a formula.
Definition 5.6.1 The argument drop function ∆A for an extension E (under some single-
extension semantics subsumed by complete semantics) in an argumentation theory AT :
∆A: Π× Π→ 2Args(AT ),
∆A(AT ,AT ±) = {A | A ∈ E(AT ),A /∈ Args(AT ±)}
The output of the argument drop function is always an empty set when adding formulae.
Proposition 5.6.1 ∀φ ∈ Ln with AT ± = AT + (φ1,AS) + . . .+ (φn,AS) then
∆A(AT ,AT ±) = ∅
Proof: Consider the opposite: ∆A(AT ,AT ±) 6= ∅. Thus, ∀A ∈ ∆A(AT ,AT ±), A ∈
Args(AT ) and A /∈ Args(AT ±), and hence Prem(A) ⊆ K(AT ) and Prem(A) 6⊆
K(AT ±). However, from proposition 5.3.4, K(AT ) ⊆ K(AT + (φ,AS)) and hence
K(AT ) ⊆ K(AT + (φ1,AS) + . . .+ (φn,AS)). Contradiction! 
The second function, the acceptability drop function, identifies those arguments that
lose acceptability when removing or adding a formula.
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Definition 5.6.2 The acceptability drop function ∆S for an extension E (under some
single-extension semantics subsumed by complete semantics) in an argumentation theory
AT :
∆S: Π× Π→ 2Args(AT ),
∆S(AT ,AT ±) = {A ∈ E(AT ),A ∈ Args(AT ±),A /∈ E(AT ±)}
The output of the acceptability drop function is always a conflict-free set when adding
a single formula.
Proposition 5.6.2 ∀φ ∈ L, ∆S(AT ,AT ± (φ,AS)) is conflict-free in AFAT
Proof: Consider an extension E under some single-extension semantics subsumed by
complete semantics. From definition 5.6.2, A ∈ ∆S(AT ,AT ± (φ,AS)) iff A ∈ E(AT )
and A /∈ E(AT ± (φ,AS)). Thus ∆S(AT ,AT ± (φ,AS)) ⊆ E(AT ). Since E(AT ) is
conflict-free [Dung, 1995], all subsets of E(AT ) are also conflict-free. 
The third function, the argument gain function, identifies those arguments that the
system gains when removing or adding a formula.
Definition 5.6.3 The argument gain function ΓA:
ΓA: Π× Π→ 2Args(AT ±),
ΓA(AT ,AT ±) = {A | A /∈ Args(AT ), A ∈ Args(AT ±)}
The argument gain function always yields an empty set when removing formulae.
Proposition 5.6.3 ∀φ ∈ Ln with AT ± = AT − (φ1,AS)− . . .− (φn,AS) then
ΓA(AT ,AT ±) = ∅
Proof: Consider the opposite: A /∈ Args(AT ), A ∈ Args(AT ±). Thus, Prem(A) 6⊆
K(AT ) and Prem(A) ⊆ K(AT ±). However, K(AT ±) = K(AT )\{φ1, . . . , φn}, hence
Prem(A) ⊆ K(AT ) and A ∈ Args(AT ). Contradiction! 
The final function, the acceptability gain function, identifies those arguments that were
acceptable in the input argumentation system and have remained in the output system, but
have lost acceptability.
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Definition 5.6.4 The acceptability gain function ΓS:
ΓS: Π× Π→ 2Args(AT ),
ΓS(AT ,AT ±) = {A | A /∈ E(AT ), A ∈ E(AT ±)}
The drop and gain functions for each type of change (i.e. argument and acceptability)
are linked to each other, in that no arguments (resp. acceptability) that are dropped are also
gained, and vice versa.
Proposition 5.6.4 For X ∈ {A, S}, ∆X(AT ,AT ±) ∩ ΓX(AT ,AT ±) = ∅
For X ∈ {A, S}, ∆X(AT ,AT ±) ∩ ΓX(AT ,AT ±) = ∅
Proof: Consider the opposite in terms of argument drop and gain: A ∈ ∆A(AT ,AT ±),
A ∈ ΓA(AT ,AT ±). From definitions 5.6.1 and 5.6.3, A /∈ Args(AT ±) and A ∈
Args(AT ±) respectively. Contradiction!
Consider the opposite in terms of acceptability drop and gain: A ∈ ∆S(AT ,AT ±),
A ∈ ΓS(AT ,AT ±). From definitions 5.6.2 and 5.6.4, A /∈ E(AT ±), A ∈ E(AT ±).
Contradiction! 
Given these properties, it can be proven that any argumentation theory can always
contracted by any subset of the arguments in the theory.
Proposition 5.6.5 For any S ⊆ Args(AT ), AT −˙S is always defined.
Proof: ∀A ∈ Args(AT ), for any φ ∈ Prem(A), A ∈ ∆−A(AT ,AT − (φ,AS)). Thus,
in the extreme case, given Φ =
⋃
A∈S
Prem(A), S ⊆
⋃
φ∈Φ
∆−A(AT ,AT − (φ,AS)) 
However, the same does not hold unconditionally for expansion. Recall that an expan-
sion must (i) have all input arguments acceptable in the derived framework and (ii) lead
to a well-formed argumentation theory. However, simple examples can show how these
principles are violated.
Consider arguments A1 : p and A2 : ¬p. It is not possible for both A1 and A2 to
be acceptable under a unique extension semantics in an argumentation theory containing
the arguments, and thus AT +˙{A1,A2} is undefined. Similarly, consider B1 : p → q
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and B2 : r → ¬q; an argumentation theory containing these arguments would not be
well-formed, since the consequences of two or more strict rules cannot be in conflict with
one another. Thus, for AT +˙S to be defined, S must be conflict-free.
Recall that when an argumentation theory is expanded, existing arguments may need
contracted to ensure the input arguments are all acceptable. This allows us to take advantage
of proposition 5.6.5 in proving that, provided S is conflict-free, AT +˙S is always defined.
Proposition 5.6.6 For any conflict-free set of arguments S (based on L),AT +˙S is always
defined.
Proof: Since for any S ′ ⊆ Args(AT ) AT −˙S ′ is always defined (through, in the extreme
case, all arguments in S being completely removed), it follows thatArgs(AT −˙Args(AT )) =
∅. Thus if AT +˙S incorporates the contraction by Args(AT ), there remain no arguments
in conflict with S and thus AT +˙S is defined. 
Finally, in order to use a change graph to determine minimal change, we first, assign
costs to edges in a change graph, based on outputs of the four functions for measuring
minimal change. We do this by computing the path cost for each path from AT to every
argumentation theory in Π′.
Definition 5.6.5 Given a change graph CG(AT ,Π′) = 〈Υ,Ω〉, the path cost from AT to
AT ′ ∈ Π′ is
V (AT ,AT ′) =| ∆A(AT ,AT ′) ∪∆S(AT ,AT ′) ∪ ΓA(AT ,AT ′) ∪ ΓS(AT ,AT ′) |
Comparing the output of V for the paths from AT to each argumentation theory in Π′
allows the minimal change(s) to be identified.
5.7 Change graph example
Having now defined a structure for determining minimal change, a simple example based
only on object-level arguments will now be presented to illustrate the concepts. A fuller
100
example, including meta-level arguments, will be given in Chapter 6 as a continuation of
the running example introduced in Chapter 4.
Consider an argumentation theory AT with a single argumentation system AS , which
in turn contains the following knowledge base and rules:
• Kp = {a1, a2, b1, b2}
• Rd = {(a1, a2 ⇒ a), (a1 ⇒ x), (a2 ⇒ y), (b1, b2 ⇒ b)}
and that a2 ∈ b1 and b ∈ c.
The arguments in the theory are as follows:
• A1 : a1
• A2 : a2
• A3 : b1
• A4 : b2
• A5 : c1
• A6 : A1,A2 ⇒ a
• A7 : A1 ⇒ x
• A8 : A2 ⇒ y
• A9 : A3,A4 ⇒ b
• A10 : A5 ⇒ c
The abstract framework derived from AT , and evaluated under grounded semantics, is
shown in Figure 5.7. For clarity, arguments with no interactions (attacking or attacked) are
not rendered in the diagram, but all are acceptable.
The grounded extension is {A1,A2,A4,A6,A7,A8,A10}.
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A2
Figure 5.7: Abstract framework from AT
Assume that we wish to achieve AT −˙{A6,A10} using only premise-based Argument
Revision. First, we consider A5; this argument contains two premises, a1 and a2; the
effects of removing these, in terms of argument and acceptability drop and gain, are shown
in Table 5.7.
φ ∆−A ∆
−
S Γ
−
A Γ
−
S
a1 {A1,A6,A7} {} {} {}
a2 {A2,A6,A8} {A10} {} {A3,A9}
Table 5.2: Possible initial removals in AT −˙{A6,A10}
Removing a2 achieves the goal of the Argument Revision process — A6 has been
lost completely, while A10 has been rendered unacceptable. Removing a1 only achieves
half of the goal, in that A6 has been lost completely, but A10 remains in the theory and is
acceptable. However, that does not mean to remove a1 is the wrong course of action — we
can consider a further change; this could be to either remove A10 completely, or actively
perform a change which is merely a consequence of potentially removing a1 (in order to
bring about a change of acceptability). The possible changes and their effects are captured
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in Table 5.3.
φ ∆−A ∆
−
S Γ
−
A Γ
−
S
c1 {A5,A10} {} {} {}
a2 {A2,A8} {A10} {} {A3,A9}
Table 5.3: Possible initial removals in AT −˙{A6,A10}
Following the removal of a1, removing either c1 or a2 will result in a contraction with
respect to A10. However, removing a2 would violate the edge-minimality condition for
paths in a change graph (definition 5.3.4), because there already exists a shorter (w.r.t.
edges) path from AT to AT −˙{A6,A10} that sees a2 removed. Thus we only consider the
removal of c1 after removing a1.
Thus AT −˙{A6,A10} = {(AT − (a1,AS))− (c1, (AS − a1)),AT − (a2,AS)}
The change graph that results from these processes is shown in Figure 5.8.
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6
AT −˙{A6,A10}︷ ︸︸ ︷
(AT − (a1,AS))− (c1, (AS − a1)) AT − (a2,AS)
6
−e1
Figure 5.8: Change graph for AT −˙{A6,A10}
The path costs are as follows:
V ((AT ,AT − (a2,AS)) =| {A2,A6,A8} ∪ {A10} ∪ {A3,A9} |= 6
V (AT , (AT − (a1,AS))− (c1, (AS − a1))) = | {A1,A6,A7,A5,A10} |= 5
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It can therefore be seen that removing a1 and c1 from the knowledge base represents
the minimal change when contracting AT with respect to A6 and A10.
This example has illustrated two important principles in Argument Revision:
1. Minimal change is not always represented by the minimal actions: in the example,
removing a2 achieved the goal of the Argument Revision, but resulted in greater
effects on the argumentation theory than removing a1 and c1.
2. Argument acceptability is an important consideration: if argument acceptability
was not considered in the example, removing a2 would have had fewer measurable
effects on the system (since a total of three arguments changed acceptability in this
removal, which would have brought the total changes down to 3).
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, a model for Argument Revision in the ASPIC+ framework has been
presented. Argument Revision takes the form of either argument expansion, where the
goal is to add and/or make acceptable a set of arguments and argument contraction, where
the goal is to remove or make unacceptable a set of arguments.
Arguments can be revised either by modifying the knowledge base or, through the use
of meta-argumentation, modifying the rules, preferences and contrariness information in
an argumentation system. A meta-argumentation system contains arguments about the
components of an object-level argumentation system, which allows these components to
be revised in the same way as object-level arguments.
A structure called a change graph was defined to allow possible methods of revising
an argumentation theory to be identified and reasoned about. In order to then choose
which methods, four measures of minimal change were specified and used to compute path
costs on a change graph. In Chapter 7, potential methods of refining the model, including
additional factors in the determination of minimal change will be discussed.
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Chapter 6
Argument revision in dialogue
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the model of argument revision presented in Chapter 5 is applied to the
dialogue protocol specified in Chapter 4 to show how, in certain contexts, argument
revision techniques can assist a participant in not only selecting a dialogue move, but also
determining its content.
Recall that in a dialogue, a participant may have arguments it wishes to keep private
(Chapter 4, p.54). Figure 6.1 incorporates private arguments into the process performed
by a participant when deciding how to respond to a claim F from their opponent. If the
participant agrees with the claim, they concede it; if not, they attempt to find a defeater of
it. So long as the participant possesses a non-private defeater, they claim its conclusion;
otherwise, they concede.
Following a concession, a participant may be forced by their opponent into retracting
any commitments that are inconsistent with the conceded statement. While identifying
and retracting those statements that make the commitment store directly inconsistent
(Chapter 4, p.58, Definition 4.4.3) is relatively trivial, retracing those that make it indirectly
inconsistent (Chapter 4, p.58, Definition 4.4.4) is less so. Consider, for instance, two
statements p and q that, together with (a meta-level representation of) a rule dp, q ⇒ re
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Input 
formula F
Acceptable arg 
for F in AS?
Concede(F)
Yes
No
Non-private 
acceptable 
defeater, A?
Utter(Conc(A))
Yes
Private 
arguments
Determine 
defeaters of 
args for F
Concede(F)No
Figure 6.1: Dialogue move selection
cause inconsistency with respect to a contrary of r. p, q and p, q ⇒ r together cause
indirect inconsistency, but individually they do not. Retracting only one would solve the
inconsistency, which then poses the question of which to retract.
As well as retracting, a participant does have a further option open to them — to be
dishonest. This is achieved through claiming something they do not believe, in an attempt
to defend their original position by defeating their opponent’s counter-argument(s).
Whichever locution the participant chooses, argument revision can assist. Initially,
the techniques can be used to compare retraction with dishonesty to determine which
is the least costly, with respect to minimal change in both existing and potential future
commitments. Then, having chosen which path to follow, the propositional content of the
locution can be chosen on the same principle — i.e. by identifying what is the minimal
way of justifying the retraction, or what is the minimal lie (again, both with respect to
impact on existing and potential future commitments).
The chapter proceeds as follows: in sections 6.2 and 6.3, argument revision techniques
are applied, respectively, to retraction of commitments and dishonesty, with the latter
also providing a specification of dishonesty in terms of the ASPIC+ framework and its
meta-level extensions.
106
6.2 Commitment retraction
6.2.1 Stability adjustments
When a participant in a dialogue cannot defend a statement against a counter-argument from
their opponent, they ordinarily should retract the defeated statement. However, retracting
the statement alone is sometimes insufficient, because they may still hold commitment to
other statements from which the retracted one is a consequence.
Recall that in an SPD dialogue, each participant’s commitment store is closed (Chapter
4, p.58, Definition 4.4.2), which means that even if a statement is retracted, if there exist
formulae from which that statement can be derived, it will remain in the closure. Consider,
for instance, the following simple example: Ciα = {φ, ψ, dφ⇒ ψe}; retracting ψ leaves
Ci+1α = {φ, dφ⇒ ψe}, however ClC(Ci+1α ) = {φ, ψ, dφ⇒ ψe}. It is, therefore, necessary
to make further retractions, with or without justification, to ensure ψ can no longer be
inferred.
Walton and Krabbe [1995] term the process of ensuring that a retracted statement can
no longer be inferred in a commitment store a stability adjustment, and use the diagram
in Figure 6.2 to illustrate one possible way in which a participant can achieve it (nodes
represent statements and edges represent inference, with the arrows indicating the direction
of support). The participant has retracted the statement P , but must also retract the circled
statements to ensure that P can no longer be inferred.
A drawback of Walton and Krabbe’s specification of stability adjustments is that they
do not explain exactly which statements should be selected; consider Figure 6.3, which
shows the same inference tree for P , but instead sees two statements on the left-hand side
retracted, as opposed to the two on the right-hand side.
The same total number of retractions has taken place, so why is it that the adjustment
shown in Figure 6.2 is used instead of that in Figure 6.3?
Argument revision offers a solution to this problem. By considering the retraction of
commitments as an argument revision process, a participant can determine what, if any,
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P
Figure 6.2: Stability adjustment from [Walton and Krabbe, 1995]
P
Figure 6.3: Alternative stability adjustment
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methods are minimal, with respect to the measures of minimal change specified in
Chapter 5.
Such a process would not, however, be carried out with respect to only existing
commitments. It is also important to consider what the participant might potentially become
committed to at a future point in the dialogue. Consider again the sample commitment
store provided above. It might be that, with respect to commitments, retracting φ is
minimal (compared to retracting dφ⇒ ψe); but if φ is a premise in several as-yet unstated
arguments in the participant’s personal argumentation theory, those arguments would be
rendered incommunicable in the remainder of the dialogue, unless the complexion changed
such that φ was returned to the commitment store.
6.2.2 Choosing what to retract
In the remainder of this section, the example introduced in Chapter 4 will be continued,
such that α chooses to concede to β and is then forced to retract commitments to resolve
the resultant inconsistency.
First, we provide a recap of the arguments that α can construct in their personal
argumentation theory, PAT α:
A1 : w1 A2 : z A3 : a1
A4 : a2 A5 : b1 A6 : c1
A7 : c2 A8 : e1 A9 : f1
A10 : g1 A11 : h1 A12 : i
A13 : A1 ⇒r8 w A14 : A3,A4 ⇒r1 a A15 : A5 ⇒r2 b
A16 : A6,A7 ⇒r3 c A17 : A8 ⇒r4 e A18 : A9 ⇒r5 f
A19 : A10 ⇒r6 g A20 : A11 ⇒r7 h A21 : A4 ⇒r9 u
A′1 : da1, a2 ⇒r1 ae A′2 : db1 ⇒r2 be A′3 : dc1, c2 ⇒r3 ce
A′4 : de1 ⇒r4 ee A′5 : df1 ⇒r5 fe A′6 : dg1 ⇒r6 ge
A′7 : dh1 ⇒r7 he A′8 : dw1 ⇒r8 we A′9 : da2 ⇒r9 ue
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A′10 : db ∈ ae A′11 : df ∈ de A′12 : dg ∈ de
A′13 : dh ∈ ge A′14 : dh ∈ ie A′15 : dy ∈ ze
A′16 : dx ∈ w1e A′17 : da2 ∈ e1e A′18 : dx ∈ a1e
A′′1 : dc ∈ db1 ⇒r2 bee A′′2 : dy ∈ da1, a2 ⇒r1 aee
Table 6.1 provides a reminder of the dialogue so far.
id pl loc t Cpl
1 α claim({a}) − {a}
2 β why({a}) 1 ∅
3 α claim({a1, a2, da1, a2 ⇒ ae}) 2 C1α ∪ {a1, a2, da1, a2 ⇒ ae}
4 β claim({b, db ∈ a1e}) 3 {b, db ∈ a1e}
5 α why({b}) 4 C3α
6 β claim({b1, db1 ⇒ be}) 5 C4β ∪ {b1, db1 ⇒ be}
7 α claim({c, dc ∈ db1 ⇒ bee}) 6 C5α ∪ {c, dc ∈ db1 ⇒ bee}
8 β claim({d, dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒ beee}) 7 C6β ∪ {d, dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒ beee}
9 α why({d}) 8 C7α
10 β claim({d1, dd1 ⇒ de}) 9 C8β ∪ {d1, dd1 ⇒ de}
Table 6.1: Dialogue fragment, from Chapter 4
Recall that α has been left in a situation where their original claim was not defensible.
In Table 6.2, we continue the dialogue with α choosing to concede β’s claim, with β in
turn demanding that α resolve the resultant inconsistency in their commitment store.
id pl loc t Cpl
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 α concede({d1, dd1 ⇒ de, dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒ beee}) 10 C9α ∪ {d1, d1 ⇒ d}
12 β resolve(a) 11 C10β
Table 6.2: Continuation of the dialogue
Having conceded d1 and dd1 ⇒ de to β, α’s commitment store is now inconsistent
because {d, dd ∈ dc ∈ db1 ⇒ beee, dc ∈ db1 ⇒ bee} ⊆ ClC(C8α), and their original claim
of a is undefended in AT D.
Since α can offer no other defence of a, their only option is to retract it. However, three
other formulae in the commitment store still allow a to be inferred: a1, a2 and da1, a2 ⇒ ae.
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Figure 6.4: Change graph for PAT α−˙{A13}
To decide which of these to also retract, α performs an argument contraction process with
respect to A13 (the argument for a). We will assume that α will, where possible, justify
the retraction (Chapter 4, p.60, Definition 4.4.5). Given the arguments in α’s personal
argumentation theory, PAT α, α is aware of defeaters of da1, a2 ⇒ ae (i.e. an undercutter
for the rule) and a1, but not a2. Thus, α performs an argument revision processes on
da1, a2 ⇒ ae and a1 through introducing those defeaters (justifying), and on a2 by simply
removing it. The change graph for this is shown in Figure 6.4.
From the change graph, the outputs of the four functions for measuring minimal change
(argument drop and gain and acceptability drop and gain) are shown in Table 6.3, where
A25 : y and A26 : x.
Given the outputs of the four functions at each edge on the change graph, α com-
putes the overall costs of each path from PAT α to the set of argumentation theories
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AS ±φ ∆A ∆S ΓA ΓS
AS1 +y ∅ {A14,A′1} {A25} ∅
AS1 + y −z {A2} ∅ ∅ ∅
AS1 −a2 {A4,A14,A21} ∅ ∅ {A8,A17}
AS1 +x ∅ {A3,A14} {A26} ∅
AS1 + x −w1 {A1,A13} ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 6.3: Outputs of the functions for measuring minimal change
PAT α−˙{A8}:
V (PAT α, (PAT α + (y,AS1)) − (z,AS1 + y)) =| {A2} ∪ {A14,A′1} ∪ {A25} |= 4
V (PAT α,PAT α − (a1,AS1)) =| {A4,A14,A21} ∪ {A8,A17} |= 5
V (PAT α, (PAT α + (x,AS1))− (w1,AS1 + x)) =
| {A1,A13} ∪ {A3,A14} ∪ {A26} |= 5
id pl loc t Cpl
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13 α retract(a, {b}) 10 C11α \{a} ∪ {b}
12 α retract(da1, a2 ⇒ ae, {y}) 10 C13α \{da1, a2 ⇒ ae} ∪ {y}
Table 6.4: Dialogue progression with α retracting
Thus it can be seen that when α retracts a, the minimal way of doing so is to retract
the rule da1, a2 ⇒ ae, justifying it with y. The subsequent progression of the dialogue is
shown in Table 6.4.
This example has illustrated two important principles. The first is that considering
argument acceptability is important when determining minimal change in a system of
argumentation based on Dung’s abstract theory. Had acceptability not been considered, the
costs of each change would have been, respectively, 3, 3 and 4, meaning that retracting
da1, a2 ⇒ ae (along with making the associated justification with y) or a2 would have been
numerically equal. Secondly, the example also shows that minimal change is not always
represented by the smallest number of changes. The minimal change identified involves
two steps — first the addition of y, then the removal of z so as to maintain well-formedness
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and reach the goal with 4 changes overall. Removing only a2 also reached the goal of the
contraction, but did so with a total of 5 changes.
6.3 Lying
Lying can be considered a fundamental human behaviour. Types of lie can range from those
which are fairly innocent and trivial (such as telling a child of the existence of Santa Claus),
to those with serious consequences (such as a politician lying while in office). Lying is an
intrinsic part of specific types of dialogue, such as negotiation, and of specific contextual
constraints of dialogue, such as those imposed by social norms and those imposed by the
need for privacy.
Sakama et al. [2010] provide a logical account of lying, with three types of dishonesty
specified — lying, which is the process of uttering a statement believed to be false; bullshit,
which is the process of uttering a statement which is grounded in neither believed truth nor
believed falsity; and deceit, which is the process of uttering some information believed
to be true, but withholding certain others with the intention that the hearer draws a false
conclusion. A main idea in Sakama et al. [2010] is that a liar wishes to keep their dishonesty
as small as possible, since by doing so it is easier to maintain. The idea of dishonesty
being kept small is strikingly similar to the notion of minimal change in belief revision
and, therefore, the theory of argument revision presented in Chapter 5. In very broad terms,
a lie is maintained by ensuring that anything that could potentially expose it is not uttered
at a future point in the dialogue; this consequence of lying is similar to the consequences
of a belief or argument revision process — through uttering the lie, the speaker must in
effect, for the purposes of the dialogue at hand, update their beliefs to accommodate it,
otherwise they risk being exposed.
The application of argument revision techniques to assist with lying in a dialogue using
SPD provides two advantages to a participant:
1. Identification of a “minimal” lie — if more than one potential lie exists to achieve
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the same outcome, which one has the least impact on remaining beliefs, with respect
to ensuring the lie isn’t exposed?
2. Maintaining a lie — if and when a lie is uttered, the revision process used in
determining its minimal status will have identified what would be lost and gained in
the participant’s beliefs and thus what the participant can no longer publicly state, or
may have to publicly concede to avoid the lie being exposed
Furthermore, a participant that is open to lying can also assess whether or not lying is
minimal with respect to retracting a commitment — that is, does uttering a “minimal” lie
have less of an impact than the minimal retraction?
6.3.1 Why lie?
At least two possible scenarios exist where a participant in a dialogue would choose to lie.
One is where it possesses no acceptable argument that defeats a previous argument from
its opponent; the other is where it does possess acceptable defeaters, but considers them
private (see Chapter 4, p.53, Section 4.2.1), thus effectively placing itself in the former
scenario, because in the context of a dialogue, a private defeater takes on the same status
as an unacceptable one, in that the participant will not communicate it.
An third, and even stronger case for lying can be made when a participant possesses
two defeaters of their opponent’s argument: one unacceptable and another acceptable,
but private. To illustrate this, consider the following knowledge base and rules in an
argumentation system, where a government minister is attempting to convince a political
opponent that they should not be spending money on welfare. The real reason is that the
government thinks a war is about to happen that will need to be paid for — but they do
not want to share this information. Instead, the position to not spend money on welfare
is justified by saying that money needs to be spent on education, despite the education
department being under-budget.
• Kp =
{
have money, education under budget, war
}
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• Rd =

r1 : war, have money ⇒ pay for war
r2 : have money ⇒ pay for education
r3 : have money ⇒ pay for welfare
r4 : education under budget⇒ ¬pay for education

• PL = {pay for war}
And with:
• r2 < r1, r3 < r1, r2 < r4, r3 < r2
• pay for war = {pay for education, pay for welfare}
• pay for education = {pay for war, pay for welfare}
• pay for welfare = {pay for war, pay for education}
The arguments in the system are:
A1: have money A2: education under budget
A3: war A4: A3,A1 ⇒r1 pay for war
A5: A1 ⇒r2 pay for education A6: A1 ⇒r3 pay for welfare
A7: A2 ⇒r4 ¬pay for education
Using the last-link principle, argument preferences are A5 ≺ A4; A6 ≺ A4; A6 ≺ A5;
A5 ≺ A7. The set of private arguments is PArgs = {A3,A4}.
The resultant abstract framework, evaluated under grounded semantics, is shown in
Figure 6.5, with acceptable arguments marked with a tick (X) and private arguments sur-
rounded by a dashed box. For clarity, islands (those arguments with no attack interactions)
are omitted.
The politician’s beliefs are, therefore,
B = {have money, war, education under budget, pay for war}.
Since A3 is a private argument, the only remaining defeater of A6 is A5. However,
regardless if A3 is considered, A5 is “out” because it is defeated by A7; thus, no honest
defeater of A6 can be offered, without sharing a private argument.
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Figure 6.5: Abstract framework for the politician example
What this example demonstrates is a situation in which a participant has the relevant
beliefs to defeat their opponent’s argument, but cannot share them for privacy reason. They
do, however, have an awareness of another argument whose conclusion they do not believe,
but claiming would result in the same outcome. If a participant’s private arguments lead it
to lie, two questions arise: firstly, what, if any, lie should it choose; and secondly how can
it be maintained?
In the remainder of this section, we first provide a specification of dishonesty in terms
of the ASPIC+ framework and Argument Revision, before using the running example to
illustrate the concepts presented.
6.3.2 Characterisation of lying in dialogue
Before answering the questions of what lie to choose and how to maintain it, we first need
to characterise what it means to lie, in terms of SPD. Sakama et al.’s [2010] account
of lying describes three forms of dishonesty — to lie is to communicate a believed-false
statement; to bullshit (henceforth referred to as bluffing) is to communicate a statement
whose truth is unknown and to deceive is to communicate (true) information with the
intention that the hearer draw an inaccurate conclusion. Since the purpose of this chapter
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is to show how argument revision can be used as a tool for supporting dishonesty, attention
will be given only to lying and bluffing.
Definition 6.3.1 (Lie)
A locution claimα({ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}) is a lie if for ϕ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}:
• ϕ ⊆
⋃
A∈Args(PAT α)
Conc(A)
• ClRs(Bα) ∩ ϕ = ∅
That is, α lies if it claims formulae for which there exist an arguments in PAT α, but it
does not believe the formulae, because it possesses no acceptable arguments for them.
Definition 6.3.2 (Bluff)
A locution claimα({ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}) is a bluff if
⋃
A∈Args(PAT α)
Conc(A)∩{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} = ∅
That is, α bluffs if it claims formulae for which there exist no arguments in PAT α
(and also, by extension, it does not believe).
Recall that SPD allows a participant to justify a retraction by possibly providing
a contrary or contradictory formula to a formula they have already claimed. This does
not preclude dishonesty, however, with the distinction between justified retraction and
dishonesty being found in the implicit intent in the locutions.
In a retraction, the participant is offering an explanation as to why it might be the case
that what they had previously stated, and are now retracting, is no longer the case. With
dishonesty, the participant makes an ordinary claim like any other, with the intention that
their opponent accept the dishonest content.
6.3.3 Argument revision and dishonesty
When a participant in a dialogue is dishonest, they claim, and thus become committed
to, something they do not believe. However, to avoid the dishonesty being exposed, the
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participant must ensure that what they subsequently communicate is consistent with respect
to the dishonest claim.
The account of lying provided by Sakama et al. [2010] stipulates that an agent should
not tell an “unnecessarily strong” lie, with strength being measured in terms of the impact
on other beliefs. Adhering to this principle makes the lie easier to maintain, because
with fewer beliefs affected, the agent is less likely to stumble. This idea of a lie having
a minimal impact is strikingly similar to the belief and argument revision concepts of
minimal change.
Further connections and parallels exist between dishonesty and belief revision, to the
extent that lying can be considered a form of belief revision, and thus if beliefs are based
on a system of argumentation, argument revision. If Alice lies to Bob, Alice communicates
information that they themselves do not believe, but intends that Bob believes they do
believe it. It is in this intention that the connection to belief revision is found — while
Alice has not revised her actual beliefs (i.e. she does not believe the statement), she has
revised the external perception of her beliefs. In order to maintain the lie, Alice must
continue to present a belief state that is both consistent and logical with respect to the lie
itself.
The model of argument revision presented in Chapter 5 can assist a dialogue participant
in not only selecting a minimal lie (through use of the minimal change calculation), but
also in maintaining it. As with retraction of commitments, a participant will not explicitly
revise their underlying personal argumentation theory when lying, because by definition
they do not believe the lies they claim. However, a difference between retraction and
dishonesty is that the latter needs maintained to avoid exposure and so the participant
needs to remain aware of the epistemic state they present. The outputs of the functions for
measuring minimal change assist in this regard.
The outputs of the argument drop and acceptability drop functions identify arguments
that, if the lie is accommodated, are lost or become unacceptable, but in either case
cannot be considered by the participant when establishing their communicable beliefs. A
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participant already has the ability to disregard acceptable arguments, and hence beliefs,
through the use of private arguments; thus, adding the outputs of the argument and
acceptability drop functions to the set of private arguments will allow those arguments to
be ignored when choosing a dialogue move.
Formally, given a formula removal or addition performed as part of an argument
revision process to support lying, we stipulate that ∆±A(φ,AS) ∪∆±S (φ,AS) ⊆ PArgs.
Arguments that are gained, or gain acceptability have the opposite effect — the par-
ticipant, depending on the course of the dialogue, may need to appear to believe the
conclusions of those arguments. While there is no existing means of maintaining aware-
ness of these arguments (unlike the set of private arguments), the principle is the same;
a participant needs a set for keeping track of arguments that are either gained or gain
acceptability when a lie is accommodated in their personal argumentation theory.
In terms of the process of Argument Revision, its execution is no different to any other,
whether it be for retraction or some other application. However, what does need to be
identified is what the process is performed with respect to. For both types of dishonesty
(lying and bluffing), the goal is for the participant to find acceptable an argument whose
conclusion is the formula upon which the lie was based.
Recall from Chapter 5 the specifications of the two forms of argument revision (con-
traction, Section 5.2.2, p.76; and expansion, Section 5.2.3, p.76). The goal of contraction
is to remove or make unacceptable a given set of arguments, while the goal of expansion
is to add or make acceptable a given set of arguments. Dishonesty, therefore, represents
an expansion, with the participant looking to add and/or make acceptable arguments that
conclude the lie.
Figure 6.3.3 shows the final stages of dialogue move selection, incorporating lying.
6.3.4 Running example
In the previous section, an example was provided to illustrate why a dialogue participant
would choose to be dishonest. In this section, we return to the running example presented
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Non-private 
acceptable 
defeater, A?
Utter(Conc(A))
Yes
Private 
arguments
No
Concede(F)
No
Utter minimal lieYesIs lying minimal?
Figure 6.6: Dialogue move selection incorporating lying (initial steps omitted)
in Chapter 4, and continued in section 6.2.2 to show how dishonesty can be integrated into
the overall process of choosing a dialogue move.
In section 6.2.2, α identified that conceding β’s claims, then retracting da1, a2 ⇒ ae
and justifying it with y represented the minimal change to their existing commitments
and remaining beliefs. However, now that dishonesty is being considered as a means of
defending a position, both α’s original concession and then all subsequent moves need to
be re-evaluated with respect to the possible lies or bluffs that could help them defend their
position.
In Figure 6.7, a reminder of the abstract framework from PAT α is provided, which
now also incorporates β’s argument for d (where, having evaluated the framework under
grounded semantics, acceptable arguments are marked with a tick; private arguments are
surrounded with a dashed box). Notice that α has an acceptable defeater of β’s argument
for d, but it is private; they possess one other defeater for d, the argument for g, but consider
it it unacceptable. To assess the effects of making the argument for g acceptable, α can
perform an argument expansion with respect to g.
When an argument already exists in a system, but is unacceptable, the goal of argument
expansion is to make it acceptable. To make the argument for g acceptable, α can either
introduce a defeater of, or completely remove the argument for h, the sole defeater of g.
Table 6.5 shows the possible ways in which this can be achieved.
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Figure 6.7: Framework from PAT α, incorporating β’s argument for d
AS ±φ ∆A ∆S ΓA ΓS
AS1 −h1 {A11,A20} ∅ ∅ {A12,A19}
AS2 −dh1 ⇒ he {A20,A′7} ∅ ∅ {A12,A19}
AS2 −dh ∈ ge {A′13} ∅ ∅ {A19}
Table 6.5: Outputs of the functions for measuring minimal change in PAT α+˙{A19}
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All three possible methods of performing the expansion rely on only one step, thus
the change graph as a structure is relatively trivial, with each expansion represented by a
single edge. This can be seen in Figure 6.8. However, the measures for minimal change
still allow the least costly lie to be identified, and whether or not uttering it is preferable
(with respect to minimal change) to conceding then retracting.
PAT α
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PAT α+˙{A19}︷ ︸︸ ︷
PAT α − (h1,AS1) PAT α − (dh1 ⇒ he,AS2) PAT α − (dh ∈ ge,AS2)
Figure 6.8: Change graph for PAT α+˙{A19}
The cost of each path is:
V (PAT α,PAT α − (h1,AS1)) =| {A11,A20} ∪ {A12,A19} |= 4
V (PAT α,PAT α − (dh1 ⇒ he,AS2)) =| {A20,A′7} ∪ {A12,A19} |= 4
V (PAT α,PAT α − (dh ∈ ge,AS2)) =| {A′13} ∪ {A19} |= 2
If α chooses to lie by considering the argument for g acceptable, the minimal way
of doing this is to ignore the contrary (attack) between h and g. The continuation of the
dialogue in this situation is in Table 6.6.
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id pl loc t Cpl
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13 α claim(g) 10 C11α ∪ {g}
14 β why(g) 11 C12β
15 α claim({g1, dg1 ⇒ ge}) 14 C13α ∪ {g1, dg1 ⇒ ge}
Table 6.6: Continuation of dialogue when α lies
Retracting vs. lying
Recall from section 6.2.2 that α identified that justifying their retraction of a by claiming
y (an undercutter to the argument for a), then removing z was minimal, resulting in four
changes overall to what they can communicate. However, when examining the effects
of lying, claiming g and making private belief in h ∈ g resulted in two changes overall.
Therefore, lying is optimal, with respect to minimality.
The example has therefore demonstrated that argument revision can assist with not
only determining the minimal retraction or lie, but also in determining which dialogue
move (i.e. retract or dishonest claim) to select in the first place.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, the model for argument revision presented in Chapter 5 has been applied to
the dialogue framework specified in Chapter 4 to show how it can assist a participant in
selecting both their next move and determine its content.
We first continued the running example from Chapter 4 by showing α as conceding
β’s argument for d, which caused their commitment store to become inconsistent and their
original argument (a) to be undefended in the shared argumentation theory. This led β to
force resolutions of the inconsistency and lack of defence. The inconsistency was resolved
through retracting a formula at the source of it, while the lack of defence of a was resolved
through retracting it.
However, α also had to retract further arguments to ensure that a was not in the
closure of their commitment store. Three possible means of doing so were identified, with
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argument revision techniques being employed to choose between them. In doing so, two
important principles were made explicit:
1. Argument acceptability is an important consideration when determining minimal
change in a system of argumentation based on Dung’s abstract theory.
2. The smallest number of explicit changes to an argumentation theory does not neces-
sarily represent the minimal change overall — in the example, one change resulted
in five changes overall; two changes resulted in four.
In addition to applying argument revision to retraction, this chapter also presented an
alternative to conceding in the first place — dishonesty. A participant could choose to be
dishonest instead of conceding a position to their opponent and, ultimately, being forced to
resolve inconsistencies in their commitment store and a lack of defence of the position. A
participant may choose to be dishonest for two reasons; either they wish to defend their
position at all costs, or they do have an argument that can act as a defence, but (using
some unspecified criteria) they have decided to keep it private. They therefore look to an
unacceptable argument to provide a defence.
A formal specification of two types of dishonesty — lying and bluffing — was provided,
influenced by the account specified by Sakama et al. [2010]. A lie is the utterance of a
statement where the participant believes a contrary statement, while a bluff is the utterance
of a statement that is grounded neither in truth nor falsity.
Argument revision was then shown to be a means through which dishonesty can be
supported, from the initial decision to be dishonest, to maintaining it to avoid detection.
The initial decision is made through using the principle of minimal change to compare
dishonesty to the effects of conceding, while maintenance is achieved through using the
outputs of the four functions for measuring minimal change as a way of the participant
being aware of what they cannot publicly become committed to, or may have to appear to
be committed to, as a result of the lie or bluff.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Summary
This thesis has presented a model for argument revision in the ASPIC+ system of structured
argumentation. The model is influenced by the AGM theory of belief revision [Alchourro´n
et al., 1985] in that it is driven by a concept of minimal change. However, a key difference
between the AGM theory and the present model is the discarding of an entrenchment
ordering over beliefs. Instead, minimal change is arrived at by considering measurable
effects on the system when a revision process is performed.
Two types of argument revision were specified: argument contraction, where the goal
is to remove or make unacceptable a set of arguments in an argumentation theory; and
argument expansion, where the goal is to add or make acceptable a set of arguments in
an argumentation theory. Both processes are similar to their belief revision counterparts,
except that the goal of each does not rely on a consistent argumentation theory (since
consistency is handled by argument evaluation), but instead requires that the resultant
argumentation theory be well-formed.
It was identified that, at the basic level, an argumentation theory can be revised by
modifying the knowledge base in an argumentation system to add or remove premises. Two
functions, formula addition and formula removal were defined to perform these actions.
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Formula addition and removal have no regard for the overall goal of the revision, but
instead take as input an argumentation system and set of formulae, and output a new
argumentation system with the formulae added to, or removed from, the knowledge base.
To achieve the goal of the revision, if it does not happen through a single action, further
additions and removals can take place.
When performing an addition or removal, the effects on the system are captured through
four functions: argument drop, argument gain, acceptability drop and acceptability gain.
These functions identify the arguments affected when a formula is added to or removed
from the knowledge base in an argumentation system. Where multiple changes are required
to reach the goal of the revision, the measures are kept separate until the goal is achieved,
because it is possible that the effects of one change are subsequently undone by another —
for instance, an argument that loses acceptability may be reinstated in a later change in the
same revision process. A structure called a change graph was defined to model the possible
changes, with an edge cost function being used to apply the measures to each edge.
As well as being able to revise arguments on their premises, it was also identified as
being desirable to revise on rules, preferences and contraries. Revising on rules provides
an additional means by which arguments can be completely removed from a system,
while revising preferences and contraries allows attacks and defeat to be modified so
as to make arguments (un)acceptable. To allow such changes, meta-level extensions to
the ASPIC+ framework were defined, where every rule, preference and contrary in an
ASPIC+ argumentation system are represented by (possibly atomic) arguments at the meta-
level. Revising these meta-level arguments (through formula additions and removals at
the meta-level, using the same functions as already defined) is reflected in the object-level
components and, by extension, arguments.
The specification of meta-argumentation in ASPIC+ differs from previous specifica-
tions, such as that by Weide and Dignum [2011], in that it requires meta-level arguments
for all non-knowledge base components at the object-level. This results in all aspects
of an argumentation theory having argumentative backing. It also allows for a better
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characterisation of strict and defeasible rules, such that an object-level rule r is strict iff
at the meta-level, no formula is declared a contrary of r; otherwise, it is defeasible. This,
in turn, allows for a more principled definition of undercutting that does not rely on the
rules, or their labels, needing to be represented in the object-language: a defeasible rule is
undercut if there is an acceptable argument for any formula which is declared a contrary of
it.
To demonstrate the application of argument revision in dialogue, a protocol for a simple
persuasion dialogue, SPD was specified. Using this protocol, a running example showed
how a participant in the dialogue can use argument revision when faced with an inability to
respond to an opponent’s claim. The participant could either choose to concede the claim,
and be forced to give up previous commitments, or they could choose to be dishonest.
Argument Revision allows a participant to decide between conceding (and possibly
retracting) and being dishonest. Using the measures of minimal change, the participant can
assess whether it is minimal to concede, then retract, or to continue to defend their position
by being dishonest. If they choose to concede and retract, Argument Revision then allows
the minimal set of retractions to be identified that allow the commitment store to remain
indirectly consistent. If they choose to be dishonest, Argument Revision allows for both the
selection and maintenance of a lie. A minimal lie is first chosen, using the determination
of minimal change, with the outputs of the four functions being used to identify arguments
that end up “off-limits” at a future point in the dialogue if the participant does not wish for
the lie to be exposed.
7.2 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are threefold: (i) meta-level extensions to the ASPIC+
framework; (ii) a model of argument revision that does not rely on a pre-determined
entrenchment ordering; and (iii) the decoupling of argument dynamics from the framework
to which they apply.
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7.2.1 Meta-level extensions to the ASPIC+ framework
Chapter 3 presents a specification of meta-level extensions to the ASPIC+ framework.
This specification provides that given an object-level argumentation system, every non-
knowledge base component of that system (rule, preference and contrariness) is represented
in the meta-language, with the associated meta-argumentation system containing an argu-
ment that concludes that meta-level representation.
Requiring rules, preferences and contrariness to be represented as (meta-level) argu-
ments provides advantages for both argument revision and the use of ASPIC+ in general.
In an argument revision context, because a meta-argumentation system is structurally no
different to one at the object-level (with the main difference being the logical language
used to instantiate the system), a single method of argument revision based on knowledge
base modification can be used to revise arguments based on premises, rules, preferences
and/or attacks.
In a broader context, the specification allows for a refined definition of undercutting
that does not rely on rules being named in the object language. Informally, an inference
rule is strict iff it holds without exception; otherwise, it is defeasible. An exception is some
situation in which a certain rule cannot be applied: “in situation X it is the case that rule
r does not hold”. It is not required for X to be true — all that is required is the relation
between X and the rule it undercuts.
Using this characterisation, we can view X as a contrary of the rule, which can be
represented using our specification of meta-argumentation. A rule r is strict iff there does
not exist an argument dX ∈ dree at the meta-meta-level; otherwise, it is defeasible.
The specification of meta-level extensions to ASPIC+ ensures that every component
(rule, preference, contrary) of an argumentation theory is represented by a (meta-) argument,
which provides advantages not only in Argument Revision, but in other applications as
well; with every component represented as an argument, they can be reasoned about in the
same way as ordinary, object-level arguments. For instance, an argument for a rule can be
presented, providing justification for why this rule holds.
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7.2.2 Revision without entrenchment
When using the AGM theory to revise beliefs, a determination of minimal change is
based on a qualitative entrenchment ordering over a belief set. Such an ordering limits
the ability of an agent in a dynamic environment to evaluate information it has accepted
post-deployment (and hence post-determination of the entrenchment ordering).
Nevertheless, the idea of minimal change itself is reasonable — update beliefs with the
minimal impact on those that remain. Thus, the model for argument revision presented in
Chapter 5 incorporates minimal change in assessing argument dynamics, but relies on a
new, justifiable means of determining it.
Instead of requiring a pre-determined entrenchment ordering, minimality is evaluated
based on measurable effects on the system. Using the ASPIC+ framework, four measures
were identified for a change operation: argument loss, those arguments completely removed
from the system; acceptability loss, those arguments that remain in the system but lose
acceptability; argument gain, those arguments that are newly added to the system; and
acceptability gain, those arguments that were previously in the system and have gained
acceptability.
A change graph was defined as a means of identifying all possible methods of perform-
ing a certain revision, with a cost function being used to apply the measures of minimal
change to each edge. An operator to compute a path cost, which considers the net drops
and gains for each measure, was also defined so as to determine what constitutes the overall
minimal change.
Removing the need for an entrenchment ordering over beliefs (or arguments), and
instead determining minimal change based on quantifiable, measurable effects a change
has on the system, allows an agent in a dynamic environment to evaluate the importance of
new information that it was not aware of when its entrenchment ordering was specified.
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7.2.3 Decoupling dynamics from the system
The model for argument revision presented in this thesis does not rely on a new argumen-
tation framework, or one tailored specifically to include dynamics, but instead uses an
existing system and remains completely external to it. The model is defined by a set of
processes that take as input an argumentation theory and the required changes, and output
a set of new, possible argumentation theories where the changes have taken place.
This decoupling provides both theoretical and application-based advantages. From a
theoretical standpoint, frameworks for argumentation, such as the ASPIC+ framework,
have several established properties. Redefining ASPIC+ to have an intrinsic model of
dynamics would require either to prove the properties still hold, or show that they don’t.
Furthermore, extensions to the framework can, in principle, make use of the revision
model without needing to be redefined on the basis of a new version of the framework that
incorporates dynamics.
In terms of applications, decoupling the model of dynamics allows it to be used as a
tool for evaluating a framework, as opposed to it being an actual part of the framework.
In a dialogical context, this allows a dialogue to be based on the framework, with the
revision model used as a strategic tool by some, but not necessarily all, of the participants.
In dialogues based on frameworks where dynamics intrinsic to the framework, every
participant has the ability to assess dynamics, based on the same criteria, removing the
strategic edge.
7.3 Future work
Directions for future work fall into two categories; theoretical extensions, and the explo-
ration of further applications, from both dialogical and wider standpoints.
7.3.1 Theoretical work
Several areas offer the potential for further work on the theoretical models presented.
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Meta-argumentation
The specification of meta-argumentation outlined in Chapter 3 provides only a set of
bijections to define a meta-argumentation system. The process of elevating object-level
components to meta-level arguments, and vice versa, is left implicit for the time being,
however for the model to be of further use, it will need to be made explicit.
Moving from the object-level to the meta-level is relatively trivial, because it involves
a flattening of the components into formulae of the meta-language, and subsequently
their type (rule, preference, contrary) is unimportant. However, if we start with meta-
arguments for the components, translating them into their relevant object-level type is
more complex, because unless assumptions are placed on the meta-language regarding the
internal structure of formulae, there is no formal method of distinguishing a rule from a
preference or a contrary.
Argument revision
The model for argument revision has scope for further refinement through considering
further features of the ASPIC+ framework. While preferences between arguments can
be revised (on their meta-level representations), they are not presently considered when
choosing between possible revision methods. Incorporating preferences into the model
could, for instance, assist in situations where two possible methods yield the same number
of changes; if one particular method perhaps drops an argument that is more preferred to a
dropped argument in another method, the former could be chosen.
A different form of preference would be to place a preference ordering over the
functions for argument revision (argument drop and gain, and acceptability drop and gain).
Such an ordering could see, for example, argument drops being given a higher priority
than argument gains, and so a method with more gains than drops (but the same number of
overall changes) is chosen.
A further extension to the model is represented by a more general possible extension
to the ASPIC+ framework, which is the consideration of the strength of defeasible rules,
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based on exceptions. Presently, the only formal role of exceptions is to determine whether
or not an inference rule should be applied (if there is an acceptable argument for an
exception it should not; otherwise, it should). However, it is possible to use exceptions in a
determination of rule strength, which in turn can have applications not only in argument
revision, but also in developing an automatic method of arriving at rule preferences.
Broadly speaking, a rule’s strength is inversely-proportional to the number of exceptions
to it (regardless if the criteria are met for the exception resulting in the rule not being
applicable) — so a rule with n exceptions is stronger than a rule with > n exceptions. In
argument revision, this would be useful when revising an argument with multiple rules;
although the exact application requires further investigation, we envisage that given a
numerical value of strength (based on the number of exceptions) that value could be used
as a scaling factor on the number of changes when removing or introducing an exception
to that rule.
7.3.2 Applications
Argument web
An obvious direction for future work in terms of applications is to exploit the connections
between ASPIC+ and the Argument Interchange Format [Bex et al., 2010, 2013] and apply
the argument revision model to real argument data. Exploring the dynamics of real data
would represent a valuable addition to tools, such as Arvina [Lawrence et al., 2012a],
which employ dialogue-based exploration of argument space [Reed and Wells, 2007] using
mixed-initiative argumentation. When engaged in a debate using an Arvina-style tool, a
user would be able to employ argument revision as a strategic tool in the same way as
autonomous agents.
132
Dialogue
While this thesis has used argument revision to assist in a persuasion dialogue, it also
has potential applications in other dialogue types. For instance, in a negotiation dialogue,
the aim of each participant is to get the best outcome for themselves. The application of
argument revision could allow a participant to assess what utterances, whether honest or
dishonest, allow this to be achieved.
There is also a potential application in co-operative dialogue domains. In their work
on teamwork in multi-agent systems, Dunin-Ke¸plicz and Verbrugge [2010] use dialogue
as a means through which agents can form teams. They specify a new dialogue type,
persuasion with respect to motivational attitudes, which arises from a situation of one party
wishing to achieve ϕ, while other parties have a conflicting intention (e.g. ψ, which is
inconsistent with ϕ), or simply have no positive motivation towards achieving ϕ. The main
goal of this dialogue is the resolution of conflict to result in a stable collective intention.
Argument revision can play a part in helping resolve the conflict through its use as a tool
by the other parties in assessing the effect of taking on the intention for ϕ.
Similar situations exist in intrinsically co-operative dialogues, such as inquiry [Black
and Hunter, 2007, 2009], where two or more participants work together to establish a truth.
In doing so, one or both may uncover information that is inconsistent with their present
beliefs, and so need to evaluate the cost of accommodating it (and sacrificing existing
beliefs).
7.4 Validating the research hypothesis
In Chapter 1, the research hypothesis motivating this thesis stated that:
A model of argument revision can be developed that is applied to, but
remains independent of, an existing system of argumentation, which in turn
can be deployed as a strategic tool in multi-agent dialogue.
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This thesis has specified a model for argument revision based on the ASPIC+ system.
The model does not redefine the system in any way, but instead uses existing features and
properties of the system in defining and describing change operations applicable to the
system. To provide a full account of argument dynamics, that considers all elements on
an argumentation system (i.e. rules, preferences and contraries as well as elements of the
knowledge base), meta-level extensions to the system were defined. However, we argue
that these extensions are not specific to argument revision, but are more general and have a
use beyond the dynamics of argumentation.
The thesis has also shown how the argument revision model can be used by a participant
in a dialogue to determine, in certain challenging situations, their next move and the content
of that move. When faced with a scenario in which their position cannot be defended,
a participant has the choice of either conceding the opponent’s position, then retracting
(some of) their own, or being dishonest.
Argument revision assists by first allowing the participant to determine whether being
honest (i.e. conceding) is minimal compared to being dishonest. If it is, the same technique
is then used to determine the minimal set of retractions required to remain consistent.
If being dishonest is identified as minimal, argument revision allows both the minimal
dishonest act to be identified, and the dishonesty to be maintained. The latter is achieving by
using the measures of minimal change as a means of retaining awareness of the arguments
affected by outwardly appearing to believe the dishonest statement.
7.5 Conclusions
This thesis has presented a model for argument revision, inspired by the AGM theory of
belief revision and designed to explore the dynamics of an existing system of structured
argumentation, and demonstrated how the model can be used as a strategic tool for a
participant engaged in a dialogue. While using AGM-style operators and concepts to model
the dynamics of an argumentation system of framework is not in itself new, we believe that
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modelling the dynamics of an existing (and not newly-defined) system is. Furthermore,
the model presented here provides an intuitive, justifiable algorithmic determination of
minimal change, that does not rely on a pre-determined entrenchment ordering but instead
uses measurable effects on the system when a change is performed.
A link between belief revision and the dynamics of dialogue was also identified and
explored as an application of the argument revision model. A simple dialogue protocol
was specified, based on the ASPIC+ framework for argumentation, and used to illustrate
two scenarios where applying argument revision techniques could prove beneficial to a
participant engaged in the dialogue. Both scenarios arise from a position of being unable
to defend a position against an opponent’s argument(s).
The first scenario sees the participant use argument revision and its determination of
minimal change as a means of determining the effect of conceding an argument to their
opponent. Upon conceding, the participant may subsequently be forced into retracting
previous commitments inconsistent with the concession, as well as any other commitments
that indirectly (through inference) result in an inconsistency. It was shown that argument
revision assists with this process by allowing a participant to evaluate, with respect to
minimal change, the effect of different retractions on both existing commitments, and
potential future commitments.
The second scenario is aimed at providing an alternative to conceding an argument
to an opponent — dishonesty. A dishonest act sees the participant utter in the dialogue
something they do not believe, with the intention that their opponent does believe it. A
characterisation of dishonesty, based on the formal specification of Sakama et al. [2010],
was provided, then uses to show how dishonesty can be characterised as a belief revision,
and by extension argument revision, process. When being dishonest, a participant still does
not believe the statement or argument at the source of the dishonesty, but must externally
appear to do so. The application of argument revision techniques allows for the minimal
dishonesty to be determined — that is, a dishonest act that has the least impact on other
beliefs. Keeping dishonesty as small as possible reduces the risk of it being exposed and
135
prevents other beliefs from being “off-limits” later in the dialogue.
These two applications of argument revision in dialogue where then combined to show
that applying the techniques can allow a participant to determine whether conceding then
retracting or being dishonest has the minimal impact on their beliefs, before choosing
exactly which retraction to perform or dishonest act to utter.
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